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Abstract
In Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd, a social work professor at a
religious college sued after she was denied promotion. The college asserted
the “ministerial exception,” a judicially crafted and constitutionally
grounded exception to the ordinary rules of liability arising out of the
employment relationship between religious institutions and their ministers.
Although the plaintiff had no distinctively religious duties, the college
expected her (and all other faculty) to integrate the faith into her teaching
and scholarship. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that
this obligation, standing alone, was insufficient to qualify the plaintiff as a
minister within the meaning of the exception. The U.S. Supreme Court denied
the college’s petition for certiorari, but Justice Alito, joined by three other
Justices, issued a statement respecting the denial. He criticized the SJC’s
view of religious education, suggested that the mere duty to infuse the faith
into teaching and scholarship was sufficient to qualify a professor as a
minister, and expressed willingness to review the SJC’s decision after a final
judgment. Nonetheless, DeWeese-Boyd’s claims may proceed to litigation.
Justice Alito’s statement is significant both for the scope of the
ministerial exception—as applied to religious colleges and other
employers—and for the future of the relationship between the Constitution’s
Religion Clauses. Justice Alito’s capacious understanding of the ministerial
exception—and his view that it is grounded primarily in the Free Exercise
Clause, rather than the Establishment Clause—will likely leave little room
for civil courts to adjudicate claims that assert wrongful treatment by
religious institutions of ministerial employees. Equally important, Justice
Alito’s view suggests a continued marginalization of the Establishment
Clause in ways that will have effects far beyond the world of higher
education.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Gordon
College v. DeWeese-Boyd,1 a case litigated in the Massachusetts state courts
that involved the scope of the “ministerial exception.” The ministerial
exception is a judicially crafted, constitutionally grounded exception to the
ordinary rules of liability arising out of the employment relationship between
religious institutions and their ministers.2 The ministerial exception clearly
applies to clergy3 and other employees of religious organizations who have
distinctively religious duties such as the obligation to lead worship or
indoctrinate students in the faith.4 The Gordon College case, however,
involved a claim by a professor of social work who had no such duties but
who was expected to infuse faith into her teaching and scholarship. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that such a responsibility,
standing alone, was insufficient to render the plaintiff a minister within the
meaning of the ministerial exception.5 As a consequence, the plaintiff could
continue to litigate her claims against the College.6
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari, it appears that the Court
came as close as possible to granting the petition. Justice Alito, joined by

1

142 S. Ct. 952 (2022).
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru,
140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020); see generally Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Civil Procedure and
the Ministerial Exception, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1847 (2018); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v
EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265 (2017); Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of HosannaTabor, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951 (2012); Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on HosannaTabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012); Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the
Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2011).
3
See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
4
See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985)
(applying ministerial exception in suit by “associate in pastoral care” at a church); EEOC v.
Roman Cath. Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F. 3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying ministerial
exception in suit by director music ministry at a church).
5
DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 163 N.E.3d 1000, 1002–03, 1018 (Mass. 2021).
6
DeWeese-Boyd alleged that the College denied her application for promotion because of her
support for LGBTQ+ rights at the College. She claimed that, in doing so, the College
discriminated against her based on gender and then unlawfully retaliated against her after she
filed a complaint. 163 N.E.3d at 1003.
2

2

three other Justices, issued a statement respecting the denial of certiorari.7
His statement noted procedural issues that made immediate review
imprudent,8 but suggested that the failure to afford broad protection to the
College would invite sympathetic review by the Supreme Court.9 Justice
Alito asserted that the Massachusetts SJC had advanced a “troubling and
narrow view of religious education,”10 and he strongly suggested that the
mere obligation to integrate faith into teaching and scholarship is sufficient
to bring a teacher within the reach of the ministerial exception.11 This
understanding of the ministerial exception goes beyond the Court’s two prior
decisions on the topic and would have broad practical and jurisprudential
implications.
As the SJC noted, such an approach could bring all teachers at religious
schools within the scope of the ministerial exception, thus depriving them of
significant employment protections imposed by neutral and generally
applicable laws.12 To be sure, religious schools already enjoy protection from
antidiscrimination claims through express statutory exemptions for religious
institutions from prohibitions on religious discrimination.13 As a
consequence, religious schools can lawfully select, supervise, and retain
employees using religious criteria. These statutory religious exemptions,
however, differ substantially from the ministerial exception. To avoid
liability for claims asserting discrimination based on protected, nonreligious
characteristics, a school must show that its action was instead based on the
employer’s religious norms.14 Under the ministerial exception, in contrast, a
7
Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd, 142 S. Ct. 952 (2022) (Alito, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari) (joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett).
8
Id. at 952 (“I concur in the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari because the
preliminary posture of the litigation would complicate our review.”); id. at 955 (stating that
the “interlocutory posture” of the case “would complicate our review”).
9
Id. at 954-55 (stating that “the state court’s understanding of religious education is
troubling”).
10
Id. at 954.
11
Id. at 955 (expressing “doubts about the state court’s understanding of religious education
and, accordingly, its application of the ministerial exception”).
12
DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 163 N.E.3d 1000, 1002–03, 1017 (Mass. 2021). (“The
integration of religious faith and belief with daily life and work is a common requirement in
many, if not all, religious institutions. As a result, the breadth of this expansion of the
ministerial exception and its eclipsing and elimination of civil law protection against
discrimination would be enormous.”).
13
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012) (“This subchapter [Title VII] shall not apply . . . to a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its
activities.”).
14
In the context of a nonministerial employee, the employee would assert a claim of adverse
employment action based on a protected class (such as race), the employer might offer a
religious justification for the employment action, and the employee would then argue that the
offered justification is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., Cline v. Catholic
Diocese, 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1999) (addressing claim by teacher at religious school who
was terminated for premarital pregnancy, which violated moral code prohibiting nonmarital
sex, and granting trial on question whether the policy was applied equally to male and female
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school merely needs to demonstrate that the employee’s duties render her a
minister; upon such a showing, a court will conduct no further scrutiny of the
specific reasons for any adverse job action.15
The broader jurisprudential implications of an expanded ministerial
exception would be equally significant. As the Court explained in HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. EEOC,16 the first Supreme Court decision to
recognize the ministerial exception, the exception has deep historical roots
and is grounded in both Religion Clauses. A prohibition on state intervention
in the choice of clergy implicates the Establishment Clause because a
hallmark of an established church is state control over church leadership. In
addition, Establishment Clause doctrine recognizes that civil courts are not
competent to resolve strictly religious questions, and the question whether a
minister should continue to serve a religious institution is (or risks
implicating) such a question. The exception also implicates the Free Exercise
Clause; the freedom to choose a faith community is inseparable from the
freedom to choose who will serve as the community’s minister.
Hosanna-Tabor involved a religious schoolteacher with specifically
religious responsibilities: teaching religious doctrine and leading students in
worship. It is not difficult to see both the Establishment and Free Exercise
concerns with a court’s adjudicating claims by such teachers that they were
impermissibly terminated. Such claims inevitably will raise the question
whether the teachers properly fulfilled their responsibilities; but under the
Establishment Clause, civil courts are not competent to determine whether
the teacher properly taught religious doctrine. The resulting interference with
the school’s relationship with those people it has selected to impart its
doctrine, moreover, would interfere with the school’s freedom to define and
share its faith.
It matters that the ministerial exception sounds in both Religion Clauses.
Grounding the exception in both clauses gives constitutional weight to the
exception but also, crucially, imposes a limit on its scope. Because a primary
justification for the exception is that civil courts lack authority to adjudicate
strictly religious questions, the exception ought to apply only in those cases
that actually involve religious activity. As a consequence, whether an
employee is a “minister” should be determined by inquiring whether the
person is responsible for engaging in specifically religious activity. To make
employees); Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(same, and rejecting employer’s argument that employee was a minister within the ministerial
exception).
15
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n
v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012); see id. at 195 (“The purpose of the exception is not to
safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason.
The exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the
faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical,’—is the church’s alone.” (quoting Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952))).
16
565 U.S. 171.
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this limit meaningful, secular courts must have authority to determine what
constitutes religious activity within the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Yet Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court in Our Lady of Guadalupe
School v. Morrissey-Berru,17 the Supreme Court’s other case applying the
ministerial exception, hints at a more expansive ministerial exception, one
that slips its tether in Establishment Clause doctrine and instead is anchored
solely to the Free Exercise Clause. Justice Alito asserted that the ministerial
exception derives from a doctrine of church autonomy, which guarantees the
“independence of religious institutions in matters of ‘faith and doctrine’” and
“matters of church government.”18 On this view, “[j]udicial review of the
way in which religious schools” select and supervise teachers who educate
students impermissibly “undermine[s] the independence of religious
institutions.”19 Justice Alito’s statement respecting the denial of certiorari in
the Gordon College case builds on this view and sends a strong signal that,
in cases involving the relationship between secular courts and religious
institutions, the Free Exercise Clause now dominates an increasingly
irrelevant Establishment Clause.20
In suits by employees of religious organizations, the likely consequence
is that there will be little room for civil courts to adjudicate claims that assert
wrongful treatment by their employers. Whereas an Establishment Clause–
based ministerial exception would permit secular courts to determine, in the
first instance, the boundaries of the category of minister for purposes of
adjudicating employment-based claims, a Free Exercise Clause–based
doctrine leaves the boundaries of the category principally to the religious
employer and its assertion about who counts as a minister. To be sure, Justice
Alito’s position does not appear to be as deferential as Justice Thomas’s
approach in Hosanna-Tabor, which would “require civil courts … to defer
to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its
minister.”21 But in practice, the difference is modest at best. Under Justice
Thomas’s view, a religious school or organization’s sincere claim that an
employee is a minister must be accepted by a reviewing court; under Justice
Alito’s view, a sincere claim that an employee is a minister is entitled to
substantial (yet undefined) deference.
If the ministerial exception rests entirely on the Free Exercise Clause,
then the limits imposed by the Establishment Clause on its scope are beside
the point. In this sense, ministerial exception doctrine appears to be following
the same trend as other apparent conflicts between the Religion Clauses in
recent decisions. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,22

17

140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
Id. at 2060 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186 (internal quotations omitted)).
19
140 S. Ct. at 2055.
20
See infra notes 171–209 and accompanying text.
21
565 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring).
22
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding that Missouri’s exclusion of churches from a funding
program for playground resurfacing violated the Free Exercise Clause).
18
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Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue,23 Carson as Next Friend of
O.C. v. Makin,24 Kennedy v. Bremerton School District,25 and other recent
cases,26 the Court looked only at Free Exercise Clause interests and either
downplayed or ignored potential Establishment Clause concerns.
Increasingly, Religion Clause doctrine focuses on the freedom of the
religious from constraints imposed on secular actors while simultaneously
demanding equal treatment of religious actors in the distribution of
government benefits. Long-standing concerns about government monitoring
of or support for religion have been subordinated to Free Exercise interests.
In Part I, we describe the origins and current status of the ministerial
exception, focusing particularly on the definition of those considered
ministers. Part II turns to DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, which has
justifiably received significant attention as it made its way through the
Massachusetts courts to the U.S. Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of
certiorari. Part III addresses the implications of the Gordon College case for
religious institutions of higher education and the status of their faculty
members, including the extent to which antidiscrimination and other
employment protections will continue to apply to decisions at those
institutions, especially at schools that require faculty to infuse the faith into
their teaching and scholarship. In Part IV, we explore broader implications
of the case, and especially the possibility that the ministerial exception will
cease to have any meaningful connection to the Establishment Clause. In our
view, this is a serious mistake. As with the Court’s other decisions that ignore
Establishment Clause values, an anchoring of the ministerial exception solely
in the Free Exercise Clause will increase the immunity of religious
organizations from general law, invite broader government funding of
religion, and potentially disable courts from drawing any meaningful line
between church and state.
I. The Ministerial Exception
In the 1970s, the lower federal courts confronted a series of employment
law claims by those who worked for religious institutions. In an increasing
number of these cases, the institutions defended by asserting a “ministerial
23
140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (holding that Montana’s exclusion of religious schools from state
scholarship program violated Free Exercise Clause).
24
142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022) (holding that Maine school voucher program in rural districts
violated the rights of students and religious schools because it excluded “sectarian” schools
from the program).
25
142 S. Ct. 2407 (2022) (holding that public high school coach has a right to engage in private
prayer at conclusion of football games, notwithstanding school district’s concern that it would
be deemed responsible for the coach’s religious activity in violation of the Establishment
Clause).
26
See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (holding that city’s refusal to
contract with Catholic adoption agency unless the agency placed children with same-sex
couples violated the Free Exercise Clause notwithstanding Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that neutral and
generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion are not subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause).
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exception” to antidiscrimination and other laws that protect employees. Title
VII and other workplace protections exempt religious organizations from
claims of religious discrimination in employment, but they do not exempt
religious organizations from other types of discrimination claims such as
those based on race or sex.27
In McClure v. Salvation Army,28 however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that Title VII should be construed to exempt from the
protections of the Act ministers employed by religious organizations.29
Accordingly, the court rejected the claim of the plaintiff, who was an officer
and ordained minister of the Salvation Army, that she had been terminated
because of her sex.30 The court construed Title VII in light of constitutional
concerns about government intrusion into religious organizations’ decisions
about their leaders.31 In particular, the Fifth Circuit relied on a series of
decisions in which the Supreme Court held that the Religion Clauses require
the government to limit its involvement in disputes over the control of
religious entities.32
In the decades that followed, other courts recognized and elaborated on
the scope of this “ministerial exception.”33 Those courts applied the
exception to all the class-based protections under Title VII,34 to claims under

27
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012) (“This subchapter shall not apply ... to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”); see also, e.g.,
D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2017) (defining unlawful discriminatory employment practices); MD
CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606 (West 2017) (same). Accordingly, an avowed atheist
cannot recover under Title VII for religious discrimination when a church refuses to hire him,
even if the position is not one that involves leading worship, religious education, or any other
religious activity. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
28
460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
29
Id. at 560–61
30
Id. at 555.
31
Id. at 558–61.
32
See id. at 559–60 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1971), Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), and United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)); see infra notes 131–161 and accompanying text.
33
See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985);
EEOC v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000).
34
See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204–09 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying ministerial
exception in case asserting race discrimination claim); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d
294, 303–07 (3d Cir. 2006) (sex discrimination); Lishu Yin v. Columbia Int’l Univ., 335 F.
Supp. 3d 803 (D.S.C. 2018) (national origin). But cf. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, #MeToo
Meets the Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment Claims by Clergy and the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 259
(2019) (arguing that ministerial exception should not apply in cases involving sexual
harassment claims, and citing federal and state court decisions that have adopted that rule);
Rachel Casper, When Harassment at Work Is Harassment at Church: Hostile Work
Environments and the Ministerial Exception, 25 U. PA. J.L. SOC. & CHANGE 11 (2021) (hostile
work environment claims).
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other federal antidiscrimination statutes,35 and to some state law claims.36 In
addition, they applied the exception in cases involving employees who were
not ordained as ministers but whose duties entailed specifically religious
activities.37
The Supreme Court first recognized the ministerial exception in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.38 The Court concluded that its prior
decisions “confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict
a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”39
The specific question in Hosanna-Tabor was whether the plaintiff, who
taught predominantly secular subjects at a religious school and had only
limited religious duties, was properly considered a minister.40 The Court
concluded that she counted as a minister for purposes of the exception.41
Although the Court expressly declined to announce a specific test for
defining ministers,42 its conclusion identified a mix of characteristics and
factors.43
Cheryl Perich served as a “commissioned” teacher, which meant that
she received special religious training and was “called” to her position by the

35

See, e.g., Tomic v. Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039–40 (7th Cir. 2006)
(applying the ministerial exception to a claim by a church music director under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
36
See, e.g., Natal v. Christian and Missionary All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989)
(applying ministerial exception in case involving breach of contract claim).
37
Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying
ministerial exception to employee who was not an ordained minister but who was an
“associate in pastoral care” at a church); EEOC v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d
795 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that director of music ministry at a church was a minister within
the meaning of the ministerial exception).
38
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
39
Id. at 185 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1971), Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94 (1952), and Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976)); see infra notes 131–161 and accompanying text.
40
565 U.S. at 177–78, 190–92.
41
Id. at 190–95.
42
Id. at 190.
43
The Court described Cheryl Perich’s responsibilities as follows:
Respondent Cheryl Perich was first employed by Hosanna-Tabor as a lay teacher in 1999.
After Perich completed her colloquy later that school year, Hosanna-Tabor asked her to
become a called teacher. Perich accepted the call and received a diploma of vocation
designating her a commissioned minister.
Perich taught kindergarten during her first four years at Hosanna-Tabor and fourth grade
during the 2003–2004 school year. She taught math, language arts, social studies, science,
gym, art, and music. She also taught a religion class four days a week, led the students in
prayer and devotional exercises each day, and attended a weekly school-wide chapel
service. Perich led the chapel service herself about twice a year.
Id. at 178. The Court relied on several features of Perich’s position in concluding that she was
a minister: “the formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in that title,
her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed for the Church.”
Id. at 192.
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congregation.44 Perich identified herself as a minister for purposes of the
“parsonage exemption” under the Federal Income Tax Code.45 As the Court
noted, part of her role as a fourth-grade teacher included specifically religious
activities: “She also taught a religion class four days a week, led the students
in prayer and devotional exercises each day, and attended a weekly schoolwide chapel service. Perich led the chapel service herself about twice a
year.”46
Eight members of the Court agreed that defining ministers for purposes
of the exception is a task properly performed by courts reviewing claims
within the reach of the exception.47 Those eight Justices implicitly rejected
Justice Thomas’s suggestion that the mere invocation of the exception by a
religious organization precludes further judicial inquiry.48
The Court based its recognition of the ministerial exception on both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The Court explained,
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission
through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which
individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause,
which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.49

The Court repeatedly stated that the ministerial exception is “grounded in the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.”50

44

Id. at 177–78.
Id. at 191–92.
46
Id. at 192.
47
Id. at 190–95 (considering the employee’s responsibilities and determining whether she was
properly considered a minister for purposes of the exception); id. at 204 (Alito, J., concurring)
(concluding that the employee was a minister for purposes of the exception because she
“played an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious message and as a leader
of its worship activities”). The Court concluded, however, that courts should not consider
whether the religious institution’s justification for the adverse employment action was
sincerely religious or instead pretextual. Id. at 194–95 (majority opinion). For an explanation
of this conclusion, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 1279–80.
48
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the Religion
Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious
organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”). Justice Thomas
reasoned “the Religion Clauses guarantee religious organizations autonomy in matters of
internal governance, including the selection of those who will minister the faith. A religious
organization’s right to choose its ministers would be hollow, however, if secular courts could
second-guess the organization’s sincere determination that a given employee is a ‘minister’
under the organization’s theological tenets.” Id. at 196–97.
49
Id. at 188–89 (majority opinion).
50
Id. at 190; see id. at 181 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with
the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”); id. at 189 (“We cannot accept
the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious
organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.”); id. at 194 (“The EEOC and Perich
originally sought an order reinstating Perich to her former position as a called teacher. By
requiring the Church to accept a minister it did not want, such an order would have plainly
violated the Church’s freedom under the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers.”).
45
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The Court elaborated on the scope of the ministerial exception in Our
Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.51 The case involved a
parochial school teacher who alleged that her termination was based on her
age in violation of the Age Discrimination of Employment Act.52 Although
the school asserted that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating the plaintiff, it invoked the ministerial exception to dispose of
the case on an expedited motion for summary judgment.53 The district court
granted the school’s motion, but the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that
“Morrissey-Berru did not have the formal title of ‘minister,’ had limited
formal religious training, and ‘did not hold herself out to the public as a
religious leader or minister.’ ”54 The Supreme Court granted the school’s
petition for certiorari and reversed.55
Justice Alito wrote the opinion for the Court and was joined by six other
Justices. The Court began by holding that an employee need not satisfy all
the factors identified in Hosanna-Tabor to fall within the ministerial
exception.56 Instead, the Court reasoned, the inquiry should be functional,
and thus does not depend on any one factor.57 Although Morrissey-Berru did
not carry the title “minister,” she nonetheless performed specifically religious
activities.58 As the Court explained, she was responsible for teaching the
basic doctrines of the faith and testing the students on their understanding of
those doctrines.59 In addition, she was responsible for preparing the students
to participate in the liturgy of the church and “was expected to take her
students to Mass once a week and on certain feast days …, and to take them
to confession and to pray the Stations of the Cross.”60 In light of MorrisseyBerru’s responsibility to teach and lead students in the practice of religion,
she more clearly performed specifically religious activities than did Perich in
Hosanna-Tabor.

51

140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
Id. at 2058. The Supreme Court consolidated Morrissey-Berru’s case with a similar case
filed by the estate of Kristen Biel, a Catholic school teacher who claimed that she had been
fired in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act when the school denied her request
for a leave of absence to obtain treatment for breast cancer. Id. at 2059.
53
Id. at 2058.
54
Id. (quoting Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe School, 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th
Cir. 2019)).
55
Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060, 2069.
56
Id. at 2063 (“[O]ur recognition of the significance of those factors in [Hosanna-Tabor] did
not mean that they must be met—or even that they are necessarily important—in all other
cases.”).
57
Id. at 2064 (“What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.”).
58
Id. at 2066 (“There is abundant record evidence that they both performed vital religious
duties.”).
59
Id. (“Educating and forming students in the Catholic faith lay at the core of the mission of
the schools where they taught, and their employment agreements and faculty handbooks
specified in no uncertain terms that they were expected to help the schools carry out this
mission and that their work would be evaluated to ensure that they were fulfilling that
responsibility.”).
60
Id. at 2057; see also id. at 2066.
52
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These duties were more than sufficient for the Court to conclude that the
court of appeals erred and to reinstate the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the school. The Court, however, did not end its inquiry
with the judgment that the plaintiff performed specifically and
unambiguously religious activities. Instead, the Court also noted that the
plaintiff was evaluated based on whether “Catholic values were infused
through all subject areas” of her teaching.61 We find it less obvious that a
requirement to infuse elements of the faith into ordinary teaching would
constitute specifically religious activity in the same way that teaching
doctrine or leading worship would. Indeed, the Court did not say whether this
requirement alone would be a sufficient basis for a finding that the employee
falls within the scope of the ministerial exception.62
As in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court’s opinion in Our Lady of Guadalupe
anchored the ministerial exception in both Religion Clauses.63 As we read
Justice Alito’s opinion, however, it subtly shifts the focus from traditional
Establishment Clause concerns to Free Exercise concerns. An approach
dominated by Establishment Clause concerns would focus on a teacher’s
required involvement in specifically religious activities. Such an
understanding of the ministerial exception rests on secular courts’ limited
competence to determine who is qualified to perform specifically religious
activities. An approach anchored primarily in the Free Exercise Clause, in
contrast, will focus on the freedom of religious schools to integrate faith into
all aspects of their educational mission.
Justice Alito’s opinion stated that the relevant religious duties of
teachers extended beyond instruction in doctrine and leading students in
worship. He observed that the plaintiffs “not only [were] obligated to provide
instruction about the Catholic faith,” but also were “expected to guide their
students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance
with the faith.”64 Justice Alito suggested that such duties matter in
determining whether a teacher is a minister because of the importance of
preserving the autonomy of religious schools.65 Such autonomy, on this view,
61

Id. at 2057.
Instead, the Court viewed the plaintiff’s duties as a whole, noting that she was responsible
both for “[e]ducating and forming students in the Catholic faith ….” Id. at 2066; accord id.
(“[N]ot only [were the plaintiffs] obligated to provide instruction about the Catholic faith, but
they were also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living
their lives in accordance with the faith.”).
63
Id. at 2060 (“[T]he Religion Clauses protect the right of churches and other religious
institutions to decide matters “of faith and doctrine” without government intrusion. State
interference in that sphere would obviously violate the free exercise of religion, and any
attempt by government to dictate or even to influence such matters would constitute one of
the central attributes of an establishment of religion.”) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. EEOC, Hosanna-Tabor, 565
U.S. 171, 186 (2012), in turn quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (internal quotations omitted)).
64
Id. at 2066.
65
Id. at 2069 (“When a school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the
responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial intervention into disputes
62
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requires courts to defer to religious entities’ characterization of the role at
issue. And indeed, Justice Alito emphasized that the school “expressly saw
[the teacher] as a vital part in carrying out the mission of the Church,” and
that the school’s “definition and explanation of [her role] in the life of the
religion … is important.”66
II. The Gordon College Case
Margaret DeWeese-Boyd was a tenured associate professor of social
work at Gordon College, an “evangelical Christian undergraduate and
graduate college” in Massachusetts.67 The College’s current governing
documents state that the mission of the College is to “provide a college
education in the liberal arts and sciences to qualified persons; to provide
training for the professions; to provide instruction in the Bible and other
subjects; [and] to prepare men and women for the work of foreign and home
missions, for the duties of the Christian ministry and other special forms of
Christian work[.]”68
The faculty handbook establishes criteria for teachers, which include
adherence to the College’s religious mission: “Gordon College approaches
its educational task from within the fixed reference points of biblical theism,
which provides a coherent perspective on life in the world.”69 All faculty
members “are expected to be fully prepared in all facets of their tasks as
Christian teachers and advisors, both inside and outside the classroom,” and
“[t]hey are expected to strive to engage students in their respective disciplines
from the perspectives of the Christian faith and to teach with accuracy and
integrity.”70 In addition, all applicants for employment at the College must
affirm “personal agreement with the Statement of Faith” and “the Statement
of Life and Conduct at Gordon College.”71
The Statement of Faith is characteristically evangelical Protestant in its
commitment to biblical inerrancy and salvation from damnation only by
personal experience of God’s saving grace.72 The Statement of Life and
between the school and the teacher threatens the school’s independence in a way that the First
Amendment does not allow.”).
66
Id. at 2066.
67
DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 2020 Mass. Super. LEXIS 73, at *4 (2020).
68
Id. at *5 (citation omitted). The original Mission Statement stated that the College strives
“to graduate men and women distinguished by intellectual maturity and Christian character,
committed to lives of services and prepared for leadership worldwide.” DeWeese-Boyd v.
Gordon College, 163 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Mass. 2021). More recent statements of the
College’s purpose tend to highlight the evangelical Christian aspects of the College’s
educational program. Id. (noting that the Colleges revised By-Laws state that the College is
dedicated to the “historic, evangelical, biblical faith ….” Id.
69
De-Weese-Boyd, 2020 Mass. Super. Lexis 73, at *8.
70
Id.
71
Id.at *10–11.
72
Id. at *11 (“[The College’s] Statement of Faith, with which faculty members must agree,
provides, inter alia, that: (1) ‘[t]he 66 canonical books of the Bible as originally written were
inspired by God’; (2) ‘[t]here is one God, the Creator and Preserver of all things, infinite in
being and perfection’; (3) ‘humankind can be saved only by the grace of God’; (4) ‘it is the
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Conduct requires commitment to the evangelical mission of the College,
reflected in personal faith and conformity with “Behavioral Standards” based
on “words and actions which are expressly forbidden in Scripture.”73
The handbook provides that faculty members are expected to “promote
understanding of their disciplines from the perspectives of the Christian
faith.”74 Similarly, teaching is evaluated in part based on the faculty
member’s “integration” of personal faith and Christian doctrine into the
subject matter of the course in a way that “encourages students to develop
morally responsible ways of living in the world informed by Biblical
principles and Christian reflection.”75 An additional component of this
infusion of faith into all aspects of their work is the requirement that faculty
members submit “an integration paper” at the end of their third year of
appointment to “detail how they integrate faith and learning.”76 The President
of the College asserted that, at the institution, “there are no nonsacred
disciplines …. Every subject matter that we pursue is informed by, shaped
by the Christian tradition.”77 Faculty members, however, do not have
specifically religious responsibilities of participating in worship services or
leading prayer.78
DeWeese-Boyd joined the Gordon College faculty in 1998, was
promoted to Associate Professor in 2004, and was granted tenure in 2009.79
In 2016, however, she was denied promotion to full Professor, even though
the “Faculty Senate unanimously recommended her for promotion.”80 The
President and Provost disagreed with the recommendation and declined to
forward her promotion application to the Board of Trustees. In their
nonconcurrence decision, they cited “a lack of scholarly productivity,
professionalism, responsiveness, and engagement.”81 They did not refer to
any “religious or ministerial matters or theological disagreement.”82
DeWeese-Boyd filed suit against the College. She alleged that she had
been denied promotion because of her vocal opposition to the College’s
policies on LGBTQ+ rights and because of her gender.83 She sought relief
responsibility of the believer to contribute by word and deed to the universal spread of the
gospel’; and (5) ‘[a]t the end of the age the bodies of the dead shall be raised[,] ... [t]he
righteous shall enter into full possession of eternal bliss[,] ... [and] the wicked shall be
condemned to eternal death.’”).
73
Id. at *12.
74
DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 163 N.E.3d 1000, 1005 (Mass. 2021).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1004.
78
Id. at 1005 (noting that “Gordon’s provost testified that faculty are not required to participate
in leading prayers or to attend regular chapel services on campus, and that the handbook does
not contain any specific reference to faculty responsibility for leading prayers”).
79
Id. at 1007.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 1008.
83
DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 2020 Mass. Super. LEXIS 73, at *21.
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under Massachusetts antidiscrimination laws and state common law contract
and tort doctrines.84
The College moved for summary judgment, asserting that the
ministerial exception bars DeWeese-Boyd’s claims.85 DeWeese-Boyd filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that, as a matter of law, she
was not a minister within the meaning of the exception.86 The trial court
denied the College’s motion and granted DeWeese-Boyd’s cross-motion.
The court concluded that, although the College is a religious institution,87
DeWeese-Boyd was not a minister for purposes of the exception. In its
decision, which the court issued before the Supreme Court’s decision in Our
Lady of Guadalupe, the trial court applied a “functional approach.”88
The trial court began by noting that, despite the many references to the
College’s Christian mission and identity, and the responsibility of faculty to
infuse faith into their teaching, “the simple promotion of a religious
institution’s mission, alone, provides little insight into whether the duties or
responsibilities undertaken by the employee carried substantial religious
significance.”89 The court also noted that DeWeese-Boyd was not expected
to proselytize or to hold herself out as “an employee authorized to speak on
Church doctrine.”90 Finally, “DeWeese-Boyd did not perform any important
religious functions for Gordon College.” The court explained that
“DeWeese-Boyd performed almost no liturgical or ecclesiastical functions
for Gordon .... She was not responsible for leading students in prayer or
devotional exercises; she did not lead chapel services or even select liturgy,
hymns, or other content for chapel services; she did not teach religion or the
Bible; [and] she did not play a particular role as a minister or spiritual
leader.”91
The trial court granted the College’s motion to seek interlocutory appeal
of the court’s determination that the ministerial exception did not apply, and
the SJC granted the application for immediate review.92 The SJC affirmed,
“conclud[ing] that Gordon College is a religious institution, but that
84

Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
86
Id.
87
Id. at *40–43.
88
Id. at *47–48. In applying this functional approach, the court closely followed the Kentucky
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587 (Ky.
2014), which involved a suit by a tenured professor of Christian Social Ethics. The Kentucky
Court focused primarily on the “important functions performed for the religious institution”
and “whether those functions were essentially liturgical, closely related to the doctrine of the
religious institution, resulted in a personification of the religious institution’s beliefs, or were
performed in the presence of the faith community.” Id. at 613–14.
89
Gordon College, Mass. Super. LEXIS, at *68 (quoting Kant v. Lexington Theological
Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587, 594 (Ky. 2014)).
90
Id. at *70 (quoting Kant, 426 S.W.3d at 594–95).
91
Id. at *71.
92
DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 163 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Mass. 2021). Cf. Tucker v.
Faith Bible Chapel Int’l, 36 F.4th 1021 (10th Cir. 2022) (holding that order denying summary
judgment on a school’s ministerial exception defense is not immediately appealable).
85
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[DeWeese-Boyd] is not a ministerial employee.”93 The Court largely echoed
the reasoning of the trial court and focused on the functions that the plaintiff
served. Specifically, “she did not teach religion or religious texts, lead her
students in prayer, take students to chapel services or other religious services,
deliver sermons at chapel services, or select liturgy ….”94
As a consequence, the case turned on the significance of the plaintiff’s
“responsibility to integrate her Christian faith into her teaching and
scholarship as a professor of social work.”95 The SJC concluded that, under
current doctrine, the ministerial exception does not extend to faculty whose
only religious responsibility is to integrate faith into their teaching and
scholarship.96
At first glance, the basis for the Court’s conclusion appears to be entirely
pragmatic. The Court reasoned that, if the ministerial exception extended to
all such faculty, the exception would threaten to swallow the rule. The SJC
noted that, if DeWeese-Boyd were considered a minister, then “the number
of employees playing key ministerial roles would be greatly increased,” thus
removing significant legal protections for those employees.97
The Court’s conclusion, however, also has a solid jurisprudential
foundation. The SJC emphasized that the Court in Hosanna-Tabor and Our
Lady of Guadalupe adopted a “functional analysis” for determining whether
an employee is a minister within the meaning of the exception.98 The SJC
accordingly examined the plaintiff’s actual responsibilities. The Court
stressed that the plaintiff “was, first and foremost, a professor of social work.
She taught classes on sustainability and general social work practice and
oversaw practicums.”99 Unlike the plaintiffs in Hosanna-Tabor and Our
93

DeWeese-Boyd, 163 N.E.3d at 1002.
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. The SJC explained,
When the ministerial exception applies, the employee may not claim important
protections of civil law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of any protected factor,
such as race, religion, national origin, sex, or sexual orientation. Such exceptional
treatment is deemed necessary to protect our religious institutions against interference
by civil authorities in the selection of those who minister to their faithful. We are thus
presented with a potential conflict between two fundamental American legal principles.
The application of the ministerial exception could eclipse, and thereby eliminate, civil
law protection against discrimination within a religious institution; in contrast, the
decision not to apply the exception could allow civil authorities to interfere with who is
chosen to propagate religious doctrine, a violation of our country’s historic
understanding of the separation of church and State set out in the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
Id. at 32; see also id. at 41–42 (noting that, if an employee is considered a minister, “the
religious institution will be free to discriminate” on the basis of age, race, or national origin);
Patrick Hornbeck, A Nun, a Synagogue Janitor, and a Social Work Professor Walk Up to the
Bar: The Expanding Ministerial Exception, 70 BUFF. L. REV. 695 (2022).
98
Id. at 46–47.
99
Id. at 47.
94
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Lady of Guadalupe, DeWeese-Boyd had no obligation to engage in
specifically religious duties.
The SJC acknowledged that the plaintiff was required to “engage in
teaching and scholarship from a Christian perspective and integrate her faith
into her work.”100 The College argued that this obligation alone rendered all
faculty—and, for that matter, all employees of the College, including the
janitorial and kitchen staffs—ministers within the meaning of the
exception.101 The SJC disagreed. The Court noted that the Supreme Court’s
two ministerial exception decisions did not address whether an obligation to
integrate or model faith in one’s work alone is sufficient to make the
employee a minister.102 The SJC accordingly examined the plaintiff’s duties,
including her job description, even more closely.
The College relied on the faculty handbook and its description of the
faculty’s role. When DeWeese-Boyd began her employment at Gordon
College, the handbook described faculty as “educators.” In 2016, after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor (and eighteen years after
DeWeese-Boyd was hired), the College’s legal counsel substantially revised
the handbook. The revised provision stated, in relevant part:
One of the distinctives of Gordon College is that each member of faculty is
expected to participate actively in the spiritual formation of our students into
godly, biblically-faithful ambassadors for Christ. Faculty members should seek
to engage our students in meaningful ways to strengthen them in their faith
walks with Christ. In the Gordon College context, faculty members are both
educators and ministers to our students.103

The SJC concluded, however, that “the label is uninstructive, not only
because it was added so late in DeWeese-Boyd’s tenure, but also because
there is abundant evidence in the record of what was required and expected
of Gordon faculty during her employment there and our focus, as the
Supreme Court has directed, is on function.”104
Notwithstanding the College’s contention that a core faculty
responsibility is to serve as a spiritual mentor to students, the SJC found no
“formal requirement[]”105 of such an obligation. In the Court’s view, “a
general exhortation for faculty ‘to be fully prepared in all facets of their tasks
as Christian teachers and advisors, both inside and outside the classroom,’”
did not alter the faculty’s primarily secular function.106 The Court reasoned
100

Id.
Id. at 48.
102
Id. at 49.
103
Id. at 37–38 (quoting faculty handbook).
104
Id. at 50. In the SJC’s view, to accept uncritically the College’s post-hoc labeling of all
faculty as ministers would have the practical effect of adopting the approach of the two
concurring Justices in Our Lady of Guadalupe, who argued for almost complete deference to
the religious employer’s defense. Id. at 49–50. Instead, the SJC concluded that it had an
independent obligation to determine whether the plaintiff was in fact a minister.
105
Id. at 48.
106
Id.
101
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that, if “all Christians teaching at all Christian schools and colleges are
necessarily ministers,” then the Supreme Court “could have simply said so
and not developed the two-prong test and functional analysis laid out in Our
Lady of Guadalupe.”107
Applying that test, the SJC concluded that “a faculty member with
DeWeese-Boyd’s responsibilities at Gordon is significantly different from
the ordained ministers or teachers of religion at primary or secondary schools
in the cases that have come before the Supreme Court.”108 The Court stressed
that she “was not ordained or commissioned; she was not held out as a
minister and did not view herself as a minister; and she was not required to
undergo formal religious training, pray with her students, participate in or
lead religious services, take her students to chapel services, or teach a
religious curriculum.”109 Finally and crucially, the SJC concluded that
DeWeese-Boyd’s “responsibility to integrate the Christian faith into her
teaching, scholarship, and advising was different in kind, and not degree,
from the religious instruction and guidance at issue in Our Lady of
Guadalupe and Hosanna-Tabor.”110
The SJC acknowledged that “a case need not mirror Hosanna-Tabor and
Our Lady of Guadalupe in order for the ministerial exception to apply.”111
The Court concluded, however, that “the facts [in DeWeese-Boyd’s suit] are
materially different.”112 As a consequence, “the significant expansion of the
ministerial exception doctrine requested by Gordon is not dictated nor, do we
believe, directed by existing Supreme Court precedent. It is our
understanding that the ministerial exception has been carefully circumscribed
to avoid any unnecessary conflict with civil law.”113

107

Id.
Id. at 51–52.
109
Id. at 52–53.
110
Id. at 53. In this analysis, the SJC closely followed the reasoning in Richardson v.
Northwest Christian University, 242 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (D. Or. 2017). Richardson involved
Northwest Christian University’s assertion that an employment discrimination claim brought
by a professor of exercise science should be barred by the ministerial exception. Applying the
“functional analysis” from Hosanna-Tabor, the federal district court held that a general duty
to integrate faith into teaching is not, standing alone, sufficient to bring a professor within the
scope of the ministerial exception. The district court reasoned,
[T]here is evidence plaintiff performed some important religious functions in her
capacity as a professor. She was expected to integrate her Christianity into her teaching
and demonstrate a maturing Christian faith. But any religious function was wholly
secondary to her secular role: she was not tasked with performing any religious
instruction and she was charged with no religious duties such as taking students to
chapel or leading them in prayer.
Richardson, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 1145. The court reasoned that the College’s position “would
permit the ministerial exception to swallow the rule that religious employers must follow
federal and state employment laws.” Id. at 1146.
111
De-Weese-Boyd, 163 N.E.3d at 1017.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1017-18.
108
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Gordon College filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in August 2021.
The Court appears to have considered the petition carefully; the petition was
distributed for conference seven times.114 Finally, on February 2, 2022, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a statement “respecting the denial of
certiorari,” Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett,
commented on the merits of the case. Justice Alito’s statement indicates
marked concern with the SJC’s definition of “minister” and its attendant
understanding of religious education, but he agreed with the “denial of the
petition for a writ of certiorari because the preliminary posture of the
litigation would complicate our review.”115 He stressed, however, that “in an
appropriate future case, this Court may be required to resolve this important
question of religious liberty.”116
Justice Alito’s statement reflects a shift from a focus on the specific
functions of the employee to the “autonomy” of the religious institution in
defining the content and method of its religious instruction.117 Most
important, Justice Alito seemed to conclude that a teacher’s obligation to
infuse faith into her teaching should be sufficient to bring the employee
within the ministerial exception.118 In his view, the approach of the
Massachusetts SJC—which relied on the fact that DeWeese-Boyd did not
“teach religion, the Bible, or religious doctrine”119—reflects “a troubling and
narrow view of religious education.”120 Justice Alito asserted that an
institution that offers a faith-infused education often treats “nominally
secular” material in a different fashion than would secular institutions, which
might take a wide range of philosophical or political perspectives on the same
material.121 Justice Alito thus strongly suggested that a religious school’s
requirement that teachers integrate faith into their teaching, standing alone,
might be sufficient to bring those teachers within the scope of the ministerial
exception.
Justice Alito’s statement makes clear that at least four Justices remain
interested in reviewing the Massachusetts SJC’s decision in the Gordon
114
See https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-145.html (case
docket).
115
Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd, 142 S. Ct. 952 (2022) (Alito, J., statement respecting
denial of certiorari in Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd, Docket No. 21–145, cert. denied,
February 2, 2022). Justice Alito noted that the parties disputed whether the Massachusetts
SJC’s decision was final or instead interlocutory, and he acknowledged that “this threshold
jurisdictional issue would complicate our review.”) Id. at 955. He concurred in the denial of
certiorari on the understanding that the College could seek review after a final judgment if
DeWeese-Boyd prevails on the merits. Id.
116
Id. at 952.
117
Id. at 954 (“In Our Lady of Guadalupe School, we explained that the ‘ministerial exception’
protects the ‘autonomy’ of ‘churches and other religious institutions’ in the selection of the
employees who ‘play certain key roles.’ ”) (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. MorrisseyBerru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020).
118
Id. at 954–55.
119
Id. at 954 (quoting DeWeese-Boyd, 163 N.E.3d at 1014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120
Id. at 954.
121
Id. at 954–55.

18

College case—and, more important, in expanding the reach of the ministerial
exception in cases that involve not only religious K-12 education, but
religious higher education as well.122
Following the denial of certiorari, the litigation in the Gordon College
case will continue in Massachusetts state court. Because the SJC affirmed the
trial court’s holding that the plaintiff is not a minister, proceedings on remand
will focus on DeWeese-Boyd’s substantive claims under Massachusetts law.
The parties will litigate whether the College properly denied the plaintiff’s
application for promotion.
It is entirely possible that the case will settle. The plaintiff’s damages
will be limited by the fact that the College decided to eliminate the social
work department two years after her claims arose.123 But the prospect of a
substantial attorneys’ fee award to the plaintiff’s lawyers, along with the
encouragement Justice Alito’s statement likely offered to the College, may
mean that the case will be fully litigated on the merits.124
122
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Kagan might be amenable to
such an expansion, given their approach in other ministerial exception cases. Chief Justice
Roberts wrote the opinion in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 176 (2012), and joined Justice
Alito’s opinion in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049,. Justice
Gorsuch joined Justice Alito’s opinion in Our Lady of Guadalupe. See id. Justice Kagan joined
Justice Alito’s separate concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor, supra at 198 (Alito, J.,
concurring), which emphasized the autonomy of a religious institution “to determine for itself
who is qualified to serve as a teacher or a messenger of its faith,” id. at 202, and his opinion
in Our Lady of Guadalupe, supra at 2054.
123
De-Weese-Boyd, 163 N.E.3d at 1004 n.7 (noting that the College eliminated the social work
department in 2019).
124
If the College wins on the merits, then there would be no federal question for the Supreme
Court to review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
writ of certiorari where … any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority
exercised under, the United States.”).
Even if DeWeese-Boyd is not a minister, litigation of her claims would not necessarily
erase concerns about judicial intrusion into religious judgments by the College. Although the
College explained its decision not to concur in the recommendation of DeWeese-Boyd’s
promotion by citing her “lack of scholarly productivity, professionalism, responsiveness, and
engagement,” DeWeese-Boyd, 163 N.E.3d at 1008, the trial court might still find that
assessment of those standards is intertwined with religious judgments. (Although the question
of scholarly productivity, which is largely a question of quantity, is unlikely to implicate
religious judgments, the other characteristics might require assessment of her infusion of faith
into the performance of her duties.) If so, the trial court cannot resolve those claims.
The trial court would not be permitted to resolve such claims for two reasons. First, the
Massachusetts statutes that authorize DeWeese-Boyd’s discrimination claims provides that
“nothing herein shall be construed to bar” religious organizations “from giving preference in
hiring or employment to members of the same religion or from taking any action with respect
to matters of employment, discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law which are calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles
for which it is established or maintained.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1, ¶ 5 (2018). Second,
under the principles announced in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of
America & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), and Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,
604 (1979), civil courts are not competent to adjudicate religious questions. See infra notes
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In Massachusetts (and in any states that choose to follow the SJC’s
reasoning), the SJC’s functional approach to the ministerial exception means
that religious colleges will need to require more of teachers than integration
of the school’s doctrine into their instruction and scholarship to classify them
as ministerial employees. Nor is it likely sufficient to revise a faculty
handbook and simply declare that all faculty are “ministers.”
It is only a matter of time, however, before the Supreme Court decides
to review a case that involves facts similar to those in Gordon College v.
DeWeese-Boyd. Justice Alito’s statement will be a looming omnipresence125
over the litigation of all claims by teachers at religious colleges. In some
cases, lower courts will follow Justice Alito’s signaling and more readily find
that teachers at such colleges are ministers when they are required to infuse
faith into their teaching and scholarship. In other cases, however, lower
courts will follow the approach of the Massachusetts SJC, thereby providing
the Supreme Court with a vehicle to address the scope of the ministerial
exception at religious colleges.
III. The Future of the Ministerial Exception
Whether a second petition for certiorari follows further litigation in the
Gordon College case or instead a similar challenge comes in a case that
applies the SJC’s approach, the U.S. Supreme Court will eventually decide
whether a duty to infuse faith into teaching and scholarship alone brings
teachers within the ministerial exception.
As a threshold matter, the Court will have to decide whether there is a
meaningful distinction between K-12 schools, on the one hand, and colleges
and universities, on the other. Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe
addressed religious K-12 schools. As we explain below, we are skeptical that
the mere duty to integrate the faith into all aspects of teaching should be
sufficient to bring all teachers (even at K-12 schools) within the scope of the
ministerial exception. But we recognize that K-12 teachers often are expected
to serve as role models, and character education is an important function at
such schools. Indeed, parents often choose to send their children to those
schools precisely because of the moral and religious values that they expect
will permeate their children’s education.
Higher education is different for several reasons. First, as a matter of
traditional Establishment Clause law, the Court has recognized that
institutions of higher education, unlike K-12 schools, segregate religious
activity from other educational functions, and accordingly may receive direct
132–150 and accompanying text. If, however, the College’s judgment about DeWeese-Boyd’s
performance rested on facts that the trial court can assess without making religious judgments,
then the case can proceed.
125
Cf. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or
quasi sovereign that can be identified; although some decisions with which I have disagreed
seem to me to have forgotten the fact.”).
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federal funding.126 The Court has assumed that the religious component of a
college’s mission does not permeate the instruction of every course or even
most of them. Second, teachers of secular subjects at religious colleges are
typically accorded the same degree of academic freedom to which those at
nonreligious colleges are entitled.127 Those faculty, moreover, usually have
advanced degrees and other training in their disciplines that is disconnected
from the college’s faith tradition. (Consider, for example, a math professor
with a Ph.D. in data science.) Even if faculty profess the same faith as the

126

See Tilton v Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680–82, 685–87 (1971). In Tilton, the Court upheld
a program that provided federal funds to construct buildings on college campuses. The
program did not exclude religious colleges. The Court noted:
There is no evidence that religion seeps into any of these [federally funded] facilities.
Indeed, the parties stipulated in the District Court that courses in these institutions are
taught according to the academic requirements intrinsic to the subject matter and the
individual teacher’s concept of professional standards. Although appellants introduced
several institutional documents that stated certain religious restrictions on what could be
taught, other evidence showed that these restrictions were not in fact enforced and that
the schools were characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather than
religious indoctrination.
Id. at 681. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), in contrast, the Court held that the
religious and secular aspects of K-12 education could not be reliably separated; the Court thus
held that direct funding was impermissible. But see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (1999)
(plurality opinion); see infra note 254.
127
Although the American Association of University Professors 1940 Statement of Principles
on Academic Freedom and Tenure stated that “limitations of academic freedom because of
religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the
appointment,” the 1970 Interpretive Comments clarify that “[m]ost church-related institutions
no longer need or desire the departure from the principle of academic freedom implied in the
1940 Statement, and we do not now endorse such a departure.” See American Association of
University Professors, Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940),
https://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure#5
(last visited July 22, 2022). Since that 1970 comment, however, the resurgence of conservative
Evangelical Protestantism (in particular) has reinvigorated or created religious colleges and
universities, giving them a “covenantal” character. See Tanner Bean & Robin Fretwell
Wilson, When Academic Freedom Collides with Religious Liberty of Religious Universities,
15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 442, 443 (2019) (borrowing the term from Stephen L. Carter, The
Constitutional and the Religious University, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 483 (1998)). See also
Gary K. House, Evangelical Higher Education: History, Mission, Identity, and Future, 6 J.
CATH. EDUC. 480, 480–83 (2003) (citing W. C. RINGENBERG, THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE: A
HISTORY OF PROTESTANT HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1984)) (noting growth in
evangelical colleges and universities after strong trends toward secularization of religious
higher education). See generally, RELIGIOUS HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
SOURCE BOOK (Thomas C. Hunt & James C. Carper eds., 2018).
Bean and Wilson describe a wide variety of conflicts between “covenantal” colleges and
regulatory institutions. These include attempts by the U.S. Department of Education and the
EEOC to require such colleges to prohibit discrimination based on gender identity or sexual
orientation. Bean & Wilson, supra at 462–63 (describing Obama Administration’s
requirement that schools apply to the Department for a waiver of Title IX; Title IX exempts
religious institutions from its ban on sex discrimination if the entity has a sincerely held
religious objection to compliance). The Council for Christian Colleges & Universities,
founded in 1976, has been a significant voice for such institutions, and continues to advocate
for the place of higher education that is completely integrated with personal faith and religious
practice. See generally https://www.cccu.org/ (last visited July 22, 2022).
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college, those teachers are more likely to instruct their students in accordance
with the norms of their academic disciplines.
As a consequence, even if the mere obligation to infuse teaching with
the faith is sufficient to render teachers at K-12 schools ministers, it is not
obvious that the same must be true for faculty at colleges and universities.
The SJC, however, did not grapple in its opinion in Gordon College with this
distinction. Nor did Justice Alito’s statement acknowledge any difference
between K-12 education and higher education.
Of course, the scope of the ministerial exception is important because it
directly affects many religious colleges and their teachers (and perhaps other
employees). The ultimate decision, though, will be even more significant
because it has the potential to reshape the fundamental relationship between
the Religion Clauses.
As we discussed above, the Supreme Court’s decision in HosannaTabor expressly grounded the ministerial exception in both of the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses.128 A close reading of the case reveals,
however, that Establishment Clause concerns predominated.129 The Court did
not ignore Free Exercise concerns; it identified religious liberty as one reason
for finding a ministerial exception.130 But the Court rested its decision on a
line of cases that addressed limits on governmental resolution of
quintessentially religious questions.131 As we explain below, such limits
derive their force principally from the Establishment Clause.
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor reached back to Watson v. Jones,132 a
federal common law decision in which the Court required judicial deference
to decisions about the ownership of congregational property made by the
highest body within the Presbyterian Church.133 The Court in Watson,
invoking a “broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under
our system of laws,” deferred to the decision of the General Assembly of the

128
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–90 (2012) (stating that the ministerial exception is
“grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment”); see also id. at 181 (“Both
Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group
to fire one of its ministers.”); id. at 189 (“We cannot accept the remarkable view that the
Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select its
own ministers.”); id. at 194 (“The EEOC and Perich originally sought an order reinstating
Perich to her former position as a called teacher. By requiring the Church to accept a minister
it did not want, such an order would have plainly violated the Church’s freedom under the
Religion Clauses to select its own ministers.”).
129
This discussion is drawn from our treatment of the same question in Smith & Tuttle, supra
note 2, at 1856–62.
130
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes
the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments.”).
131
See id. at 185–87.
132
80 U.S. 679 (1871).
133
Id. at 733; see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185–87 (citing Watson, 80 U.S. 679).
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Presbyterian Church that awarded ownership to one of the competing
factions.134
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor also relied on Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America.135 In Kedroff,
the Court adopted Watson’s reasoning as a matter of constitutional doctrine
under the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.136 Kedroff involved a dispute
between a local Russian Orthodox congregation in New York and the church
hierarchy in Moscow over control of the Russian Orthodox Cathedral in New
York and the appointment of church leaders in the United States.137 The state
legislature had enacted a law that required every Russian Orthodox church in
New York to recognize as authoritative determinations of the North
American–based governing body.138 The New York Court of Appeals relied
on the law in ruling against the Russian Orthodox hierarchy in Moscow,139
but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.140 The Court held that civil government
must not usurp church authority to decide “strictly ecclesiastical” matters.141
Because of the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Court ruled,
such decisions belong to the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian
Orthodox Church.142
134

80 U.S. at 733.
344 U.S. 94 (1952); see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186–87 (citing Kedroff).
136
344 U.S. at 115–16 (noting that the Court decided Watson “before judicial recognition of
the coercive power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the limitations of the First
Amendment against state action,” but that “[f]reedom to select the clergy, where no improper
methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional
protection”).
137
Id. at 95–97.
138
Id. at 97–99. The Court described the law at issue, Article 5-C of the Religious Corporations
Law of New York, as follows:
The purpose of the article was to bring all the New York churches, formerly subject to
the administrative jurisdiction of the Most Sacred Governing Synod in Moscow or the
Patriarch of Moscow, into an administratively autonomous metropolitan district. That
district was North American in area, created pursuant to resolutions adopted at a sobor
held at Detroit in 1924. This declared autonomy was made effective by a further
legislative requirement that all the churches formerly administratively subject to the
Moscow synod and patriarchate should for the future be governed by the ecclesiastical
body and hierarchy of the American metropolitan district.
Id. at 98–99.
139
See Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am. v. Kedroff, 96
N.E.2d 56, 74 (N.Y. 1950).
140
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 115. The Court reaffirmed this approach in Presbyterian Church in the United States
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). Blue Hull
involved the effort of a majority of a congregation to split from the denominational body
because of the denominational body’s liberal stances on controversial political and social
issues. Id. at 442 n.1. As in Kedroff, the conflict at issue was over ownership of church
property. Id. at 441–43. The Georgia trial court held that the denomination had departed from
traditional Presbyterian doctrine and, therefore, the congregation had the right to claim the
property upon its departure from the denomination. Id. at 443–44. The Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed, Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church,
159 S.E.2d 690, 701 (Ga. 1968), but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that courts
135
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The Court in Hosanna-Tabor also relied on Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese for the United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich,143 which
reaffirmed the principle in Kedroff. Milivojevich involved the efforts of the
U.S.-based Bishop Milivojevich to resist the authority of the Belgrade-based
church hierarchy.144 The hierarchy had restricted the size of Milivojevich’s
jurisdiction.145 When he resisted, the hierarchy removed him from his
position.146 Milivojevich filed suit in Illinois state court, claiming that the
church had failed to follow its internal procedures for removal of a bishop.147
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with Milivojevich and ordered him
restored to his diocese and the diocese restored to its original size.148 The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts lack authority to resolve
“quintessentially religious controversies.”149 The Court stated that when
“hierarchical religious organizations” adjudicate disputes over internal
discipline and church governance, “the Constitution requires that civil courts
accept their decisions as binding upon them.”150
Although these cases cited the First Amendment in general rather than
relying separately on the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise
Clause,151 the Court’s core reasoning in each case must be based on the
are not competent to decide what constitutes fidelity to the doctrines of a particular faith. Blue
Hull, 393 U.S. at 445–46 (stating that it is “wholly inconsistent with the American concept of
the relationship between church and state to permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical
questions”). The Court explained that “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when
church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies
over religious doctrine and practice.” Id. at 449. Accordingly, “the First Amendment enjoins
the employment of organs of government for essentially religious purposes” and “commands
civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over
religious doctrine.” Id.
143
426 U.S. 696 (1976); see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 187 (citing Milivojevich).
144
426 U.S. at 704.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 705.
147
Id. at 706–07.
148
Id. at 708; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. of Am. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 328
N.E.2d 268, 284 (Ill. 1975).
149
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 720.
150
Id. at 724–25. In Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), which involved a dispute between
competing factions over church property, the Court clarified that state and federal courts are
not always bound to defer to the hierarchy of a particular denomination in resolving a dispute
within a religious body. Instead, the Court held that “a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt
neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute,” id. at 604,
which the Court defined as “objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law
familiar to lawyers and judges,” id. at 603. But the Court also imposed an important limit on
the use of “neutral principles” to resolve intrachurch disputes: “If in such a case the
interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a
religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the
authoritative ecclesiastical body.” Id. at 604; see also id. at 602 (“As a corollary to this
commandment, the Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of
religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization.”).
151
See, e.g., Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 698, 709–10; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 100 n.5 (1952); see also United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969).
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Establishment Clause. First, in none of these cases did the Court suggest that
a balancing of interests would be appropriate in resolving the disputes.152 In
the middle of the twentieth century, when the Court decided Milivojevich,
such balancing was a hallmark of decision under the Free Exercise Clause.153
In Free Exercise Clause cases in that era, the Court measured interference
with religious liberty against the state’s interest in regulating the matter in
question.154 But the Court made clear in Milivojevich and other cases that the
prohibition on adjudication of religious questions is categorical and not
contingent on the relative strength of the government’s reason for
intervention.155 In Establishment Clause cases, by contrast, the Court never
considers whether an alleged violation of the Clause is outweighed by some
governmental interest advanced by the challenged action. Instead, the Court
simply asks whether the challenged action is one subject to categorical
prohibition.
For example, the Court’s cases addressing prayer or religious exercises
in public schools do not consider the state’s interest in fostering such piety.156
The mere fact of state-sponsored religious indoctrination renders such
conduct impermissible. Similarly, state funding of worship or religious
indoctrination—such as the purchase of Bibles for distribution to Christian
congregations—would violate the Establishment Clause regardless of the
state’s purported interest in promoting morality in the citizenry through Bible

152

See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 1276–77.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (determining “whether some
compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right” under the Free
Exercise Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (“The freedom to act
[under the Free Exercise Clause] must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement
of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining
a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”); id. at 307 (noting that the “State
of Connecticut has an obvious interest in the preservation and protection of peace and good
order within her borders” and inquiring “whether the alleged protection of the State’s interest,
means to which end would, in the absence of limitation by the Federal Constitution, lie wholly
within the State’s discretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has come
into fatal collision with the overriding interest protected by the federal compact”).
154
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
155
See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713 (“[T]his is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment
prohibits; recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious
controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept
the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.”); see also Blue Hull, 393 U.S.
at 449 (“[T]he First Amendment enjoins the employment of organs of government for
essentially religious purposes . . . .”).
156
See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (agreeing with the petitioners’ argument
that “the State’s use of the Regents’ prayer in its public school system breaches the
constitutional wall of separation between Church and State” because “the constitutional
prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this
country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group
of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government”).
153
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study.157 The same is true when the government displays quintessentially
religious symbols with the purpose of promoting religion.158
Second, the cases cited in Hosanna-Tabor focused narrowly on the
religious character of the questions presented to the lower courts. In those
decisions, the Supreme Court held that governmental bodies, including
courts, lack the competence to resolve strictly and purely ecclesiastical
questions.159 Although the indirect consequence of this approach is a zone of
freedom for churches in their decision-making, the Court’s primary focus
was on the secular character of civil government and its lack of authority and
capacity to resolve quintessentially religious disputes. The assertion of such
jurisdiction had been a hallmark of many colonial courts in the preRevolutionary era and particularly in states with established churches.160 But
this relationship between religious organizations and the state has been
soundly rejected by courts and other institutions of civil government since
the founding era.
As noted above, the Hosanna-Tabor Court relied squarely on the line of
cases starting with Watson in concluding that the ministerial exception
exists.161 Those cases stand for the proposition that certain questions are
simply beyond the authority of secular civil government to decide. The
ministerial exception should be understood and applied in light of that
proposition. In other words, the exception does not recognize a broad
autonomy for religious institutions; instead, it reflects only a specific
limitation on the power of government to resolve certain ecclesiastical
matters. In this sense, the limitation is primarily imposed by the
Establishment Clause, even if it also promotes interests within the scope of
the Free Exercise Clause.162
As we explained above, Justice Alito’s opinion in Our Lady of
Guadalupe hinted at an alternative source for the ministerial exception, and
his statement regarding the denial of certiorari in Gordon College brings that
157

See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 822 (1999) (plurality opinion) (recognizing the
Establishment Clause’s “prohibition against the government providing impermissible
content”); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 602–03 (1971) (holding that laws that provided
direct public funds for religious education violated the Establishment Clause).
158
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“When the
government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates
that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no
neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.”).
159
See, e.g., Milivojevich, 426 U.S.698; Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 445–49; Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 95 (1952); accord
Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am., 363 U.S.
190, 190–91 (1960) (per curiam); Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S.
1, 17–19 (1929).
160
See JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 52
(2008).
161
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n
v. EEOC, 565 U.S. at 185–87 (citing and discussing Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich).
162
Some scholars have argued that the creation of a ministerial exception is misguided. See,
e.g., Corbin, supra note 2.
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source to the forefront.163 The question of the proper source for the ministerial
exception is not merely academic. The argument based on ecclesiastical
deference, reflected in the case law from Watson to Milivojevich, focuses on
the limited competence of civil courts to decide “quintessentially religious
questions.”164 The argument based on church autonomy, in contrast, draws
primarily from the Free Exercise Clause and focuses on the interest of
religious organizations in controlling their own institutions and personnel,
free from government regulation.
On the Establishment Clause view, the ministerial exception flows from
the courts’ lack of capacity to decide religious questions. The contours of the
exception, then, should reflect this core justification for the doctrine. At a
minimum, courts have the capacity to determine what constitutes “religion”
for purposes of interpreting the Establishment Clause.165
We believe that the Establishment Clause provides the proper grounding
for the ministerial exception. We believe further that civil courts applying the
exception should make the threshold determination of who is a minister for
purposes of the exception. We reach this conclusion by starting from a basic
premise: the First Amendment limits government authority to make laws
“respecting an establishment of religion,”166 and civil courts must have
jurisdiction to determine what constitutes such an establishment. In other
words, civil courts must determine the meaning of “religion” for
Establishment Clause purposes. Courts exercise this responsibility in every
Establishment Clause case. For example, to conclude that a speech at a high
school graduation impermissibly promotes religion, the court must first
decide that the speech was fundamentally religious in nature.167
Similarly, in a case that involves a ministerial exception defense to
claims by an employee of a religious organization, the court must decide
whether the employee falls within the definition of minister. That definition,
in turn, depends on the court’s determination that the employee’s role is one
that has sufficient hallmarks of those things that are religious for
163

See supra notes 115–121 and accompanying text.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 720.
165
Civil courts retain the power and responsibility to decide the threshold question whether
adjudication of a particular question falls outside their competence. For example, a civil court
could not decide which of two factions of a divided church was more faithful to the historical
confession of the church. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. 253 (Ct. of App. 1842).
But the decision to abstain follows an initial determination that the matter in question is a
quintessentially religious one. Blue Hull, supra at 445 (noting that case involved controversy
“over religious doctrine and practice”). The Establishment Clause, like other provisions of the
Constitution, operates against a background assumption that courts must adjudicate
controversies properly brought before them.
166
U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ….”).
167
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992) (stating that the challenged practice
of including benediction at graduation involved “the performance of a formal religious
exercise”).
164
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Establishment Clause purposes. Just as school-sponsored prayer in a public
school implicates the Clause because courts recognize that prayer is a
quintessentially religious activity, an employee who leads others in prayer
and indoctrinates others in the faith engages in religious activity and would
properly fall within the ministerial exception. Crucially, however, the court,
and not the religious employer, must determine that the employee’s role is
sufficiently religious to bring her within the scope of the exception.168
The centrality of the Establishment Clause in ministerial exception cases
rests on an even more fundamental principle of jurisprudence: the right to
equal treatment under the law. It is uncontroversial to assert that courts
should treat similarly situated parties the same. In some cases, however, the
Establishment Clause requires departure from this principle. Ordinarily, an
employee who has experienced an adverse employment decision can seek
redress under antidiscrimination law or other civil employment protections.
When an employee of a religious organization makes such a claim, the
default assumption is that the employee enjoys the same rights as any other
employee.
Courts should depart from this norm only when the Establishment
Clause169 requires them to do so. As we explained above, the Establishment
Clause prohibits courts from resolving strictly religious questions, including
the fitness of a particular person to serve in a role that includes religious
functions. Once again, the court must evaluate the role to determine whether
it includes such religious functions. If a court instead permits the religious
employer to determine who is a minister within the meaning of the exception,
then the court will have allowed the employer to become the judge in its own
case.170 At a minimum, courts have a responsibility to determine when
departure from the norm of equal treatment is warranted.
Grounding the ministerial exception in the Establishment Clause has
three principal doctrinal implications. First, as we have noted, courts, and not
religious employers, must determine which employees are ministers for
168
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 1278 (“This question of role is functional, not
ecclesiastical. Were the question of ministerial status ecclesiastical, employers would be free
to answer it unilaterally, in a wholly self-interested way.”); id. (defending the “[r]etention of
judicial control over the factual predicates of the ministerial exception”).
169
Statutory provisions might also require departure from the norm of equal treatment. For
example, Title VII permits religious entities to make employment decisions based on religion,
notwithstanding the statute’s general prohibition on such discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (2012) (“This subchapter [Title VII] shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals
of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”).
170
The Federalist Papers No. 10 (James Madison) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his
own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity.”); see also Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 890 (1990) (rejecting a rule that permits exceptions from neutral and generally applicable
laws due to sincere religious objections because under such an approach “each conscience is
a law unto itself”).
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purposes of the exception. Second, to determine whether an employee is a
minister, courts must define those functions that constitute quintessentially
religious activity—principally, leading worship and providing instruction in
the tenets of the faith—within the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Third, because courts, and not religious employers, will make the threshold
determination, the ministerial exception will less frequently conflict with the
norm of equal treatment.
The view that Justice Alito advanced in his statement in the Gordon
College case, in contrast, treats the ministerial exception primarily as a
corollary of the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause protects the
liberty of individuals and institutions to engage in religious activity.171 On
Justice Alito’s view, those individuals and institutions effectively have the
power to define what constitutes “religious activity” within their
understanding of their faith.
Justice Alito’s view derives from the Court’s decision in Thomas v.
Review Board.172 In Thomas, the plaintiff, a Jehovah’s Witness, sought
unemployment benefits after leaving his job at a foundry that made parts for
military equipment.173 Relying on Sherbert v. Verner, he claimed an
entitlement to benefits because he could not continue, consistent with his
religious conscience, to perform his job.174 The benefits hearing officer
allowed the introduction of evidence that another member of his faith
community did not believe that the work was “unscriptural.”175 The Indiana
Supreme Court, relying on this evidence, concluded that Thomas lacked a
religious basis for his claim, reasoning that he was motivated instead by a
“personal philosophical choice.”176 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the government may not second-guess a person’s sincere
assertion about a matter of religious conviction.177 The Court explained,
[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all
of the members of a religious sect…. [I]t is not within the judicial function and
judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation.
The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine
whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his work

171
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (“[T]he right to the free exercise of religion
unquestionably encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious
functions ….”).
172
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
173
Id. at 709–10. Thomas had previously worked in a different department, but when his
employer closed the department, Thomas was transferred to a department that made
armaments. Id.
174
Id. at 710–11.
175
Id. at 711.
176
Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1130 (Ind. 1979); see
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713–15.
177
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
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because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion.…
[J]udicial review is confined to the facts as found and conclusions drawn.178

After the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,179 there
were far fewer opportunities for religious claimants to seek exemptions from
neutral and generally applicable laws.180 Indeed, the Court did not again
address the sincerity and substantiality of a religious claim until Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,181 which involved a commercial entity’s claim
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) that the Department
of Health and Human Services had imposed a substantial burden on its
religious exercise. The respondent asserted that the requirement that it
provide insurance coverage for contraception to its employees conflicted
with its faith.182 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, held that the
requirement imposed a substantial burden in violation of RFRA.183 The Court
relied on Thomas, reasoning that “it is not for us to say that [the respondent’s]
religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”184 Although Hobby Lobby
involved a claim under RFRA, Justice Alito has made clear his view that the
same standard should apply to claims for exemptions under the Free Exercise
Clause.185
This view of the Free Exercise Clause prioritizes the right of individuals
and organizations to determine for themselves what counts as religious
activity that deserves legal protection.186 If the ministerial exception derives
178
Id. at 715–16; cf. Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (concluding that “to have the
protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief”).
179
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
180
In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 to
require strict scrutiny for government actions that impose a substantial burden on religious
exercise. Pub. L. No. 103-141, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; see Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
181
573 U.S. 682 (2014).
182
Id. at 701–04.
183
Id. at 736.
184
Id. at 707 (stating that “our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ whether
the line drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction …’ ” (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716)).
185
See Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1924 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Alito argued in Fulton that the Court should have overruled Smith, id. at
1894–1924, and adopted the model of Free Exercise analysis that he applied in Hobby Lobby,
id. at 1924 (urging Court to adopt a rule under the Free Exercise that provides that a “law that
imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise can be sustained only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest”).
186
See id. at 1884 (“The city of Philadelphia [has] issued an ultimatum to an arm of the
Catholic Church: Either engage in conduct that the Church views as contrary to the traditional
Christian understanding of marriage or abandon a mission that dates back to the earliest days
of the Church—providing for the care of orphaned and abandoned children” (emphasis
added)); see also Helen M. Alvare, Church Autonomy After Our Lady of Guadalupe School:
Too Broad? Or Broad as It Needs to Be?, 25 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 319 (2021); Stephanie H.
Barclay, Untangling Entanglement, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1701 (2020); Richard W. Garnett,
“The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions:
Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009); Douglas Laycock, “The
Things That Are Not Caesar’s: Religious Organizations as a Check on the Authoritarian
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from this view of the Free Exercise Clause, then religious employers, and not
courts, have authority to determine what counts as religious activity within
their faith tradition. It follows that the religious employer also determines
who functions as a ministerial employee responsible for providing or leading
such religious activity.
In our view, Justice Alito overreads the Court’s decision in Thomas. The
Court in Thomas focused on the competence of civil courts to adjudicate
disputed tenets of the faith as between members of that faith tradition.187 The
Court’s decision, however, did not deprive courts of the power or obligation
to determine whether the plaintiff is actually claiming that the duty or
prohibition in question imposes a substantial burden on sincere religious
exercise.188 In order to resolve that question, courts must determine what
constitutes religious exercise within the meaning of the First Amendment.
For example, imagine that an employee at a large manufacturer refuses
an assignment to the firearms division at the company. After he is terminated,
he seeks unemployment benefits. He asserts that he is an atheist and that, as
a matter of moral conviction, he cannot be complicit in the production of
weapons. A court can properly determine that his claim does not fall within
the Constitution’s definition of religion.189 In contrast, imagine that a
different employee is fired after refusing to work on Sunday, which is her
faith’s day of rest. A court can properly determine that her claim involves
religious exercise and that the denial of unemployment benefits substantially
burdens that exercise.

Pretensions of the State”: Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253 (2009);
Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). But see
Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1099, 1112 (“Church autonomy is not and should not be a doctrine recognized
in the United States.”).
187
To be sure, the Court’s decision in Thomas went beyond its prior (and subsequent) cases
involving the denial of unemployment benefits. In the other cases, the claimants suffered
adverse employment consequences because of their commitment to observe the Sabbath.
Observance of the Sabbath fits squarely within any manageable definition of religious
“exercise.” See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); cf. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)(sacramental use of peyote). In
Thomas, however, the plaintiff asserted a religiously motivated justification for his refusal to
work in an armaments factory. 450 U.S. at 709–10. There is a difference between worship, on
the one hand, and a set of moral beliefs inspired by religious faith, on the other.
188
See, e.g., Frederick M. Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They
Must) Judge Burdens on Religion under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94 (2015).
189
See Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (“A way of life, however virtuous and
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it
is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the
claims must be rooted in religious belief. Although a determination of what is a ‘religious’
belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the
very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.”).
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In other words, there is a fundamental difference between a court’s
deciding disputed theological questions, on the one hand, and determining
whether a case involves religious exercise, or a substantial burden on such
exercise, on the other. Thomas prohibits courts from engaging in the former,
but not the latter. In Justice Alito’s view, however, Thomas effectively
disables courts from questioning (1) whether a claim is religious, (2) whether
the claim involves religious exercise, and (3) whether the claim imposes a
substantial burden.
To be sure, Justice Alito’s view does not appear to be the most
employer-favoring view on the Court. Justice Thomas would require courts
to “defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who
qualifies as its minister.”190 Justice Alito appears to contemplate some greater
degree of judicial scrutiny of employer claims that a position is ministerial.
Just how much, however, is unclear. In Hosanna-Tabor, Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion focused on the function performed by the employee but
concluded by emphasizing that the religious function must be viewed from
the employer’s perspective.191 In his statement in the Gordon College case,
he shifted his focus even more towards the employer’s perspective. He
summarized the basis of the ministerial exception by stressing the “the
‘autonomy’ of ‘churches and other religious institutions’ in the selection of
the employees who ‘play certain key roles.’ ”192
The practical consequences of Justice Alito’s approach to the ministerial
exception are significant. First, following Thomas v. Review Board, Justice
Alito’s approach will accord substantial deference to religious employers’
assertions of what constitutes “religious activity” within their faith
tradition.193 This is at the heart of Justice Alito’s statement in the Gordon
College case. He chided the Massachusetts SJC for advancing a “troubling
and narrow view of religious education” that ignored the College’s own
understanding of what religious education entails.194 Justice Alito explained,
What many faiths conceive of as ‘religious education’ includes much more than
instruction in explicitly religious doctrine or theology.… [R]eligious education
at Gordon College does not end as soon as a student passes [required courses
in Bible, theology, and worship] and leaves the chapel. Instead, the college asks
each member of the faculty to ‘integrate’ faith and learning, i.e., ‘to help
students make connections between course content, Christian thought and
principles, and personal faith and practice.”195
190

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n
v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012)(Thomas, J., concurring).
191
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 205 (Alilto, J., concurring) (“What matters in the present case
is that Hosanna-Tabor believes that the religious function that respondent performed made it
essential that she abide by the doctrine of internal dispute resolution; and the civil courts are
in no position to second-guess that assessment.”).
192
Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd, 142 S. Ct. 952, 954 (2022) (quoting Our Lady of
Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020)).
193
See supra notes 171–186 and accompanying text.
194
Gordon College, 142 S. Ct. at 954.
195
Id. at 954–55 (emphasis added).
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The first sentence of this assertion is telling. Justice Alito implied that the
proper judicial inquiry should focus on the employer’s perception of what
constitutes “religious activity,” not on some objective account of that
category.
Second, by deferring to religious employers’ understanding of religious
activity, Justice Alito’s approach necessarily leaves to religious employers
the presumptive power to decide who counts as a minister. As Justice Alito
stated in Our Lady of Guadalupe,
In a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be
expected to have a complete understanding and appreciation of the role played
by every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition. A
religious institution’s explanation of the role of such employees in the life of
the religion in question is important.196

Religious organizations have considerable incentives to classify employees
as ministers, because the ministerial exception functions to protect the
organizations from liability for many workplace claims. It is therefore
reasonable to expect employers to advance a capacious understanding of who
functions as a minister.
For example, Gordon College argued not only that “the integrative
function applies to all teachers at the college, whether they teach computer
science, calculus, or comparative religion,” but also that it applies “to all its
employees, as integrating the Christian faith into daily life and work is part
of the college’s mission for everyone in the community, whether they be
coaches, food service workers, or transportation providers.”197 In other
words, Gordon College effectively defined its entire workforce as ministers.
Under Justice Alito’s approach, such understandings would be presumptively
determinative.
Indeed, a Free Exercise–based ministerial exception, in conjunction
with a different strain of Establishment Clause doctrine, might make it
impossible in practice not to defer to religious employers’ definitions of
religious activity and ministerial employees. Under Justice Alito’s approach,
a teacher at a religious school can be a minister solely because she is required
to integrate the faith into her teaching. Courts that follow Justice Alito’s
approach and seek to determine whether teachers actually infuse the faith into
their courses might face a different constitutional problem. Such scrutiny
inevitably raises concerns about the state’s impermissible entanglement with
religion.
Entanglement concerns were the basis for the Court’s decision in Lemon
v. Kurtzman,198 and more recently appeared in Judge McConnell’s opinion
196

Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added).
DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 163 N.E.3d 1000, 1017 (Mass. 2021).
198
403 U.S. 602, 613–14, 619 (1971) (invalidating state program that provided funding to
religious schools because a “comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance
will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First
197

33

for the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Christian University v. Weaver.199 In
Colorado Christian University, the court invalidated a state’s exclusion of
students attending “pervasively secular” colleges and universities from
eligibility for certain state scholarship funds. The court found especially
objectionable the prospect of state officials examining the syllabi of courses
to determine the extent to which religion is infused into the instruction.200
At first blush, such limits on state and judicial scrutiny seem inconsistent
with an approach to the ministerial exception, such as the SJC’s in the
Gordon College case, that requires courts to conduct a close inquiry of the
religious nature of an employee’s duties. We believe, however, that the
entanglement concern does not undermine the SJC’s approach, and in fact
reinforces our understanding of the ministerial exception grounded firmly in
the Establishment Clause. Under the SJC’s approach, a teacher is a minister
within the exception if she performs specifically religious activities such as
instruction in religious doctrine or scripture. Determining whether a teacher
performs such functions is not likely to require excessive entanglement for
the same reason that determining that a public high school graduation speech,
steeped in explicitly religious language and offered by a minister, does not
lead to excessive entanglement.
Consider how a court would address the ministerial exception in
practice. Courts generally resolve disputes over an employee’s status under
the ministerial exception at the summary judgment stage.201 To support a
motion for summary judgment, the school could seek to demonstrate that the
teacher taught quintessentially religious content; in the SJC’s view, there
would be no need to demonstrate a link between a “religious worldview” and
the otherwise secular subject matter of a course, because an obligation to
integrate the faith into teaching is not sufficient to qualify the employee as a
minister.202 A judicial determination that a teacher’s responsibilities are
quintessentially religious does not require the kind of intrusive inquiry at
issue in Lemon or Colorado Christian University. The faculty member can
testify about her duties and what expectations the school communicated to
Amendment otherwise respected,” which “will involve excessive and enduring entanglement
between state and church”).
199
534 F.3d 1245, 1261–62 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that denial of scholarship funds to
students attending “pervasively religious” institutions violates the Religion Clauses).
200
Id. at 1261–63, 1266 (concluding that administrative scrutiny of course content involves
“excessive entanglement and intrusion” into the religious beliefs and practices of the religious
institutions).
201
See Smith & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 1874–76.
202
See, e.g., Palmer v. Liberty Univ, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 248963 (W.D. Va. 2021). In
Palmer, a teacher at a religious college filed suit after she was terminated, alleging age
discrimination. The university invoked the ministerial exception, but the judge denied the
university’s motion for summary judgment on those grounds. The court granted the former
teacher’s cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that she was not a minister for
purposes of the exception. Although the university argued that all faculty had an obligation to
“integrate a Christian worldview in their respective disciplines,” the court found that the
professor had no duty to teach explicitly religious content and that she never included such
content in her classes. Id. at *16–20.
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her about religious instruction. And the school can then show the specifically
religious doctrines that it expects teachers to communicate. A court could
then determine whether the teacher is actually expected to perform religious
functions, such as worship or instruction in religious doctrine, without
deciding whether religion “infuses” the curriculum.
Under Justice Alito’s approach, however, courts would have to
determine whether religion or tenets of the faith are genuinely integrated into
the curriculum. Because Justice Alito has a much more capacious
understanding of “religion,” regulators’ inspection of course syllabi and
materials would necessarily be more expansive and thus intrusive. To avoid
the form of entanglement that courts have rightly eschewed, courts would
have to give even more deference to the religious institution’s assertions
about what constitutes religion and the employee’s status—to adopt, that is,
Justice Thomas’s view, which would effectively leave religious
organizations outside of the ordinary operation of employment law.
Third, because of this judicial deference both to what constitutes
religious activity and to who counts as a minister, Justice Alito’s approach
may have implications for a wide range of employers. Hosanna-Tabor and
Our Lady of Guadalupe make clear that this deference applies to
determinations by religious primary schools.203 This deference would extend
to religious secondary schools.204 Justice Alito’s stern warning in his
statement in the Gordon College case suggests that the same deference will
apply in the context of religious higher education.
There is no reason in principle to believe, moreover, that this deference
is limited to the context of religious schools. Religious social welfare
organizations have many employees who work generally to advance their
employers’ mission. For example, a nurse at a religiously affiliated hospital
might be expected to integrate the teachings of the faith into the provision of
care. A case worker for homeless families at a faith-based social services
office might be instructed to infuse religious values into every aspect of the
work with those families. A counselor at a drug treatment program might be
obligated to invoke a specific higher power in carrying out the client’s
treatment plan. In each of these examples, the employee has a general
obligation to integrate faith into the day-to-day performance of the job. Given
Justice Alito’s focus on the religious employer’s autonomy—and
corresponding power to decide both what constitutes religious activity and
who acts as a minister—we see no obvious principled basis to afford these
employers less deference than the doctrine gives to religious schools.
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Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n
v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 177–78 (2012) (applying ministerial exception to teacher at religious
K-8 school); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055–59
(2020) (applying ministerial exception to claims by teachers at religious elementary schools).
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See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2064 (“Religious education is vital to many faiths
practiced in the United States.”); id. at 2066 (noting that “[e]ducating and forming students in
the Catholic faith lay at the core of the mission of the schools where [the plaintiffs] taught”).
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If we are correct that Justice Alito’s approach would apply equally in
the context of religious social welfare organizations, then the ministerial
exception to employer liability begins to swallow the rule. More than one
million people work for religious or religiously affiliated social welfare
organizations.205 This is a substantial number of potential “ministers” who
would lose the protection of antidiscrimination and other basic employment
laws.
In addition, Justice Alito’s approach might extend to for-profit
commercial entities that claim a religious identity. In Hobby Lobby, for
example, a closely held corporation asserted rights to protection of its
religious liberty under RFRA.206 Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court
concluded that this corporation enjoyed the same right to religious liberty as
any individual, and he explicitly tied these rights to those arising under the
Free Exercise Clause.207 If these entities count as religious employers, then
they might have the power to designate at least some of their employees as
ministers.208 To be sure, it is difficult to perceive what religious activity an
employee at a hobby store performs.209 But under Justice Alito’s approach,
the employer has substantial room to define what counts as religious activity
and who serves as a minister performing that activity.
In sharp contrast to Justice Alito’s vision, courts originally created the
ministerial exception as a prophylaxis, designed to ensure that courts did not
decide fundamentally religious questions.210 It is uncontroversial that a
religious organization may terminate a minister who deviates in her sermons
from the doctrines of the faith; it is equally uncontroversial that a court cannot
adjudicate such a dispute, because a civil court cannot decide what is

205
Reliable estimates are scarce, but Catholic hospitals alone employ more than 700,000
workers. See Catholic Health Association of the United States, U.S. Catholic Health Care,
https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/the-strategicprofile.pdf (last visited July 5, 2022).
206
573 U.S. 682, 702–03 (2014).; see id. at 703 (noting that “Hobby Lobby’s statement of
purpose commits the [family that owns the company] to ‘[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do
by operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles’”).
207
Id. at 707 (“[P]rotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations protects the religious
liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”).
208
See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of
Corporate Identity, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 373 (Chad Flanders, Zoe
Robinson, & Micah Schwartzman eds., 2016).
209
Id. at 375 (noting that the “distinctive religious character of these organizations is
frequently quite thin”).
210
In McClure v. Salvation Army, the first case to recognize a ministerial exception to claims
under Title VII, the court explained,
Matters touching [the] relationship [between a religious organization and its ministers]
must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern. Just as the initial
function of selecting a minister is a matter of church administration and government, so
are the functions which accompany such a selection. It is unavoidably true that these
include the determination of a minister’s salary, his place of assignment, and the duty
he is to perform in the furtherance of the religious mission of the church.
460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).
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orthodox within that (or any) faith tradition.211 But no judicially created
exception would be necessary in such a case today, because the principal
statutory protections for employees include an explicit exemption for
religious organizations from the prohibitions on religion-based
discrimination.212
Courts devised the ministerial exception to address cases that involved
claims other than facially apparent religion-based discrimination.
Employment claims that assert other types of discrimination are outside of
the reach of the religious exemption in antidiscrimination statutes. Imagine,
for example, that a female minister is terminated from her position. The
minister sues, asserting a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII or
comparable state-law protections. The employer responds by asserting a
nondiscriminatory justification for the adverse decision.213 The plaintiff
responds by asserting that the employer’s justification is pretextual.
Adjudication of whether the defense is pretextual risks serious
entanglement with religious decisions. This is obvious if the employer’s
justification is based on the minister’s poor sermons or deficient pastoral
care. But the ministerial exception is prophylactic in that it applies even if
the employer’s justification does not on its face question the employee’s
performance of a religious task. Even in such cases, there is a substantial risk
that adjudication of whether the employer’s defense is pretextual will require
the court to decide whether religious tasks have been properly performed.214
In other words, the courts that originally recognized the ministerial
exception assumed that the performance of certain jobs is so essential to the
faith that an ecclesiastical question would be highly likely to arise in
litigation over the employee’s performance. This is why those courts,
including the U.S. Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor, anchored the
ministerial exception in decisions that addressed judicial competence to
resolve certain intrafaith disputes.215 As we explained above, the Court has
long held that civil courts lack authority to adjudicate such disputes because
civil authority does not reach into quintessentially religious matters.216
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See, e.g., Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Iowa 2007);
McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Ga., 381 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. 1989); Marsh v. Johnson, 82
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1935).
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See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2017); MD CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV’T § 20-606 (West 2017).
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This is what happened in the Gordon College case. See DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College,
163 N.E.3d 1000, 1002–03, 1017–08 (Mass. 2021). (noting that the President and Provost
asserted that the nonconcurrence decision was based on poor job performance rather than
disagreement about theological matters).
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Butler v. St. Stanislaus Kostka Cath. Acad., 2022 U.S. Dist. Lexis 113040 (E.D.N.Y. 2022),
at *35–41.
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See McClure, 460 F.2d at 559–60 (citing Watson, Gonzalez, Kedroff, and Blue Hull);
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 185–97 (2012)(citing Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich).
216
See supra notes 131–161 and accompanying text.
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These limits on judicial authority exist even when the parties willingly
submit their dispute for resolution by a civil court. Although the ministerial
exception is an affirmative defense,217 the religious organization is not free
to waive the limit on the court’s competence.218 For example, in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catholic University of America, the
plaintiff claimed that she had been denied tenure because of her sex.219 The
university did not assert the ministerial exception in its defense; instead, it
argued, among other things, that the plaintiff’s scholarship lacked the quality
required by the school’s tenure standards.220 The court invoked the
ministerial exception sua sponte to avoid judging the quality of the plaintiff’s
Roman Catholic canon law scholarship.221
EEOC v. Catholic University underscores the root of the ministerial
exception in the Establishment Clause. If the exception arose from the Free
Exercise Clause and its protection for church autonomy, then the religious
employer would be free to waive it.222 Because the exception exists to limit
the scope of judicial authority, the parties do not have ultimate control over
its application.
Despite Justice Alito’s strong signals to the contrary, we continue to
believe that the ministerial exception is best understood as a prophylaxis that
guards the limits on civil court competence. On our account, the scope of the
exception should be carefully circumscribed to advance that prophylactic
function. The ministerial exception is not a generative norm that creates new
powers for religious institutions. It simply ensures that courts will abstain
from decisions that are closely bound up with quintessentially religious
questions. The definition and recognition of such questions belongs to civil
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See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 (“We conclude that the exception operates as an
affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.”); see generally
Smith & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 1864–72.
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See Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 2015)
(holding that ministerial exception is not waivable); cf. Michael J. West, Note: Waiving the
Ministerial Exception, 103 VA. L. REV. 1861 (2017) (arguing that ministerial exception can
be waived but that parties cannot confer on civil courts jurisdiction to decide religious
questions); but see Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as
Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891, 1901, 1921–23 (2013) (arguing that a religious
organization can waive a ministerial exception defense).
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83 F.3d 455, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Id. at 459.
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Id. at 460.
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autonomy, then the church arguably would be estopped from raising the exception in such a
case. But cf. Corbin, supra note 2, at 960–64 (arguing that the court could have adjudicated
Perich’s retaliation and reinstatement claims without deciding ecclesiastical questions).
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courts in light of broader theories about the government’s secular character.
It cannot be left to the subjective beliefs of religious organizations.
IV. Further Implications of the Broad Ministerial Exception
The dispute in Gordon College involves only the relationship between
the religious employer and its employees. A broad ministerial exception in
the form contemplated by Justice Alito, however, is likely to have
implications for the relationship between religious institutions and the
government, as well. Specifically, it is plausible to argue that the theoretical
underpinnings of a broad ministerial exception, grounded in church
autonomy, require the government to exempt religious organizations from
certain conditions on the receipt of public funds.
Imagine, for example, that some rural school districts in Oregon do not
have a public secondary school. The state permits those school districts to
contract with a nonpublic school to provide students with access to a high
school education. Under state law, schools that enter contracts with a district
to provide such opportunities must agree not to discriminate in hiring on the
basis of race, sex, or sexual orientation.223 Imagine further that the state
denies a religious school’s contract bid because the school refused to sign a
pledge to refrain from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. May
the state exclude the school from participation in the program?224
The answer is surprisingly complicated. In Carson as Next Friend of
O.C. v. Makin,225 the Supreme Court held that Maine could not exclude
religious schools from a closely related program for rural school districts. In
that program, the state gave parents in such districts a choice among public
schools in adjacent districts and private schools.226 The statute, however,
required eligible private schools to be “nonsectarian.”227 The Supreme Court
held that the exclusion of nonsectarian schools impermissibly denied parents
and religious schools equal access to public funds, in violation of the Free
Exercise Clause.228
There are two notable differences between our example and the program
at issue in Carson. First, the program in Carson did not involve direct
223
We focus here on conditions that prohibit discrimination in the hiring of school employees,
not on the admission of students. Because students obviously are not employees of the schools,
the schools cannot rely on the protection of the ministerial exception to defend discriminatory
admissions policies.
224
This example is based on Maine’s statutory scheme for contracts for secondary education
in rural districts. ME. REV STAT. ANN. § 5204(3) (2022).
225
142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022).
226
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5204(4) (2022) (“A school administrative unit that neither
maintains a secondary school nor contracts for secondary school privileges … shall pay the
tuition … at the public school or the approved private school of the parent’s choice at which
the student is accepted.”).
227
Id. § 2951(2) (requiring that any school receiving tuition assistance payments must be “a
nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution”).
228
Carson, 142 S. Ct. at 2002.
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funding,229 whereas our example does. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Carson, however, appears to make the distinction between direct and indirect
funding essentially irrelevant.230 Second, whereas the program in Carson
expressly prohibited the use of state funds at sectarian schools, in our
example the state’s requirement does not explicitly exclude religious schools.
The program accordingly does not “discriminate” on the basis of religious
identity or character. Instead, some religious schools will claim that the
nondiscrimination requirement will force them to choose between receiving
government funds and adherence to their religious principles.231
A core element of the decision in Carson and the line of decisions that
it follows is that religious organizations should not be forced to make such a
choice.232 But the Court held in Employment Division v. Smith233 that the Free
Exercise Clause does not require exemptions from neutral and generally
applicable requirements for those with religious objections to compliance. In
addition, the Court in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia234 specifically declined
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In this context, “indirect” funding refers to public money that flows to an institution because
of the intervening choice of the program beneficiary, in this case the parents. “Direct” funding
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to overrule Smith,235 notwithstanding Justice Alito’s extensive opinion
concurring in the judgment, which urged the Court to do so.236 The
requirement in our example that participating schools refrain from
discrimination based on sexual orientation is neutral and generally
applicable.237
In other words, it is not clear under current Free Exercise doctrine
whether the state would be compelled to fund a religious school that refuses
to comply with the antidiscrimination requirement.238 For the purpose of this
article, we will assume that the rule in Smith would apply. In practice,
however, a broad ministerial exception might nonetheless require the state to
include the religious school in its funding program.
Return to the example above. A religious school in Oregon requires
teachers to integrate the faith into all aspects of its curriculum. The school
applies to participate in the funding program for rural districts but asserts that
its religious doctrine precludes it from employing gay and lesbian teachers.
The school explains that, for the reasons suggested by Justice Alito in his
Gordon College statement, its teachers are ministerial employees. Finally,
the school argues that the state’s eligibility requirement functions as a form
of state control over its selection of ministers.
The school’s basic contention is similar to a conventional Free Exercise
claim: the state’s condition impermissibly forces the school to choose
between religious principle and access to public funds. But Justice Alito’s
version of the ministerial exception provides a different, and potentially
stronger, basis for the school’s objection.
Whereas the rule in Smith presents a significant obstacle to the school’s
Free Exercise claim for an exemption from the antidiscrimination
requirement, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor expressly held that the ministerial
exception applies notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Smith.239 The Court
reasoned that Smith “involved government regulation of only outward
235
Id. at 1876–77 (stating that “we need not revisit [Smith] here” because “[t] his case falls
outside Smith ….”).
236
Id. at 1883–1926 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (urging the Court to overrule
Smith).
237
“Government fails to act neutrally when it proceeds in a manner intolerant of religious
beliefs or restricts practices because of their religious nature.” Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877. “A
law is not generally applicable if it ‘invite[s]’ the government to consider the particular reasons
for a person’s conduct by providing ‘a mechanism for individualized exemptions,’ ” id.
(quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884), or if it “prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular
conduct that undermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar way,” Fulton, 141 S.
Ct. at 1877 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542–46
(1993)).
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physical acts,” whereas the teacher’s claim in Hosanna-Tabor “concern[ed]
government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith
and mission of the church itself.”240 The Court therefore concluded that the
“contention that Smith forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception
rooted in the Religion Clauses has no merit.”241
Indeed, the school’s claim to be exempt from the nondiscrimination
condition in the contract proves more potent than even a pre-Smith assertion
of a “substantial burden” on religious exercise. For the three decades before
the Court’s decision in Smith, courts purported to apply a test comparable to
strict scrutiny to claims under the Free Exercise Clause for exemptions from
neutral and generally applicable rules.242 Under that approach (which the
Court did not consistently follow), if the claimant could show a substantial
burden on religious practice imposed by such a rule, then the state would be
required to demonstrate that it had a compelling interest in denying the
exemption.243
As noted above, the ministerial exception—because of its doctrinal
roots in the Establishment Clause—does not permit courts to balance the
state’s interest in promoting equality norms in the workplace against the
religious institution’s interest in control over the selection of ministers.244
When a religious employer successfully demonstrates that an employee falls
within the ministerial exception, the court can reject the employee’s
discrimination claim, no matter how strong on the merits—and no matter
how important, as a matter of public policy, the antidiscrimination norm
might be.245 Even though Justice Alito seeks to ground the ministerial
240
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exception in the Free Exercise Clause, there is no indication that he would
abandon this Establishment-Clause–based aspect of the exception.246
Because all of the teachers at our hypothetical religious school fall within
Justice Alito’s understanding of the ministerial exception, the school would
effectively be free of nondiscrimination obligations in its employment
relations with them.
The question remains whether the state may exclude from participation
in the program schools that refuse to comply with the antidiscrimination
requirement. After all, if the state does not fund the school, the state will not
interfere with the school’s selection or retention of teachers.
Prior to the Court’s decision in Carson, the state could have contended
that its program did not discriminate against religious schools based on their
religious identity. In Trinity Lutheran, the Court expressly distinguished
between state discrimination on the basis of religious status, on the one hand,
and religious use of government funds, on the other. The case involved
funding for playground resurfacing, and the state program categorically
excluded churches from eligibility.247 The Court concluded that such
discrimination on the basis of religious identity violated the Free Exercise
Clause.248 In a footnote, however, the Court stated, “We do not address
religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”249
In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue,250 the Court continued
to rely on this distinction between status and use. In that case, the state sought
to include religious schools in a program that provided tax deductions for
donations to create scholarships at primary and secondary schools. The state
Supreme Court held that the state constitution barred the use of state funds
for religious schools and, as a remedy, ordered the state to end the program—
for scholarships at all schools, religious and secular. The U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that the state court’s interpretation of its constitution violated the
Free Exercise Clause.251 The Court reasoned that the interpretation reflected
discrimination against religious schools because of their religious identity.252
246
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Before the decision in Carson, therefore, the state could have defended
the hypothetical condition of nondiscrimination in employment by arguing
that the condition does not exclude religious schools because of their
religious identity. If a religious school agrees not to discriminate in hiring on
prohibited grounds, then the school will be fully eligible to participate in the
program.
In Carson, however, the Court rejected the distinction between religious
identity and religious use. The court of appeals had concluded that Maine’s
exclusion of religious schools from the program to provide rural students
with access to a high school did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because
the program “impose[d] a use-based restriction,” rather than a status-based
one. The Supreme Court rejected the distinction. The Court acknowledged
that Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza “held that the Free Exercise Clause
forbids discrimination on the basis of religious status,” but it asserted that
“those decisions never suggested that use-based discrimination is any less
offensive to the Free Exercise Clause.”253 After Carson, states may no longer
deny funds to religious schools simply because religious schools might use
the funds for religious purposes.254
In our example, the school could plausibly argue that the state’s
nondiscrimination requirement operates in practice as discrimination based
on religious use of the funds precisely because its teachers are ministers. The
argument would proceed in five steps. First, the school will note that the state
effectively funds the operation of schools that participate in the program.
Second, those funds necessarily would be used to support the hiring of
teachers. Third, the function of the teachers at our hypothetical religious
253
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Id. at 809.
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school will be to deliver the school’s religious message and to mold students
in the faith. Fourth, state requirements that limit the school’s power to select
and exercise control over those teachers prevent the school from using the
state’s funds for religious purposes. Fifth, the school would argue that, in
practice, only schools that have religious beliefs that are compatible with the
state’s antidiscrimination norms (or schools that do not consider their
teachers to be ministers) would be eligible to participate in the program. In
this sense, the antidiscrimination condition operates as a restriction on the
religious use of funds.
To be sure, we do not find this argument persuasive, even accepting
Carson’s rejection of the status-use distinction. The antidiscrimination
condition does not inevitably control the religious content of classroom
instruction. The school would still be free to require teachers to deliver that
content in a manner consistent with the faith.
But Justice Alito’s expansive account of the ministerial exception, and
more broadly of the Free Exercise Clause, opens the door to arguments like
those of our hypothetical school. In a world in which a religious school can
define all of its teachers as ministers, and in which “pervasively sectarian”
schools are constitutionally entitled to government funds on an equal basis
with other nonpublic schools, the state risks losing its power to advance
nondiscrimination norms in hiring. In our example, it is at least plausible that
the school would be entitled to insist on participation in the state program
without compliance with the nondiscrimination requirement.
V. Conclusion
The Gordon College case returns to the state courts against the backdrop
of an unsettled but diminishing account of the Establishment Clause. In
Hosanna-Tabor, both Religion Clauses anchored the exception. After Justice
Alito’s statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Gordon College, we
suspect that it will become increasingly difficult to locate in the doctrine any
remaining traces of the Establishment Clause. As we argued above, an
exception derived entirely from Free Exercise principles, at least on Justice
Alito’s account, deprives civil courts of nearly all capacity to control the
scope of the exception. As with his general Free Exercise jurisprudence,
based on his vast overreading of the Court’s decision in Thomas v. Review
Board, religious claimants alone determine the religious significance of an
asserted exception.
We think that this approach is wrong as an interpretation of both
Religion Clauses. As one of us has argued elsewhere, Justice Alito misreads
the relevant constitutional history in his argument that Smith should be
overruled.255 At the time of the founding, state constitutions consistently
255
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described the protected scope of religious exercise as worship, religious
instruction, and proselytizing—provided that those practices did not disturb
the public welfare. No state constitution included any protection for
religiously motivated objections to otherwise secular civil laws.256 We
believe that the Court should focus on those same characteristics of religion
in its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. The state impermissibly
“establishes” religion when it engages in, sponsors, or attempts to control
worship, religious education, or proselytizing.
We do not believe that this approach results in a secular “public square,”
as many have argued.257 This understanding of religion for purposes of the
Religion Clauses is a legal, rather than a theological, construct. It does not
claim to define the subjective experience of believers or religious
communities. As a legal matter, religion involves actions that do not have
clear secular analogs, such as worship, prayer, ritual, or indoctrination in
matters of the faith that do not substantially overlap with matters of the
secular world. The nonreligious or secular is not necessarily a space where
God is absent.258 It is simply a domain where religious motivations and
actions are outwardly indistinguishable from those motivated by secular
concerns.
Our approach recognizes a fundamental symmetry between the Religion
Clauses,259 whereas the current approach fully subordinates
nonestablishment principles to free exercise interests. In the context of the
ministerial exception, our approach would follow the functional analysis that
the Court appeared to endorse in Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of
Guadalupe. Civil courts are competent to decide when a position involves
worship, religious instruction, or proselytizing—because those are the same
features that courts must be competent to assess in order to interpret the
Establishment Clause.
Does a religious college’s requirement that teachers “infuse” the faith
into their teaching and scholarship make them religious educators? It depends
on the facts—on whether, for example, the teacher is evaluated on that basis,
or whether the teacher engages in “specifically religious instruction” (i.e.,
invoking religious doctrine or interpreting religious texts), or whether the
teacher leads students in prayer or worship. If the instructor who is simply a
religious role model for students is deemed a minister, however, then all
mooring in the Establishment Clause, as well as the original meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause, is lost.
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